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INFORMATION COSTS AND REVERSE PAYMENT
SETTLEMENTS: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN
THE COURTS AND THE ANTITRUST AGENCIES
Brenna E. Jenny†
Abstract
Reverse payment settlements have attracted increased scrutiny
due to the controversial presence of a payment from a brand-name
drug company to a generic company that is ostensibly preparing to
infringe on the branded company’s patent. The antitrust agencies
and the courts settled into an intergovernmental stalemate regarding
the appropriate framework of analysis to apply when reviewing
antitrust challenges to these settlements. The FTC and DOJ have
viewed the deals skeptically as a vehicle for competitors to split
monopoly profits, but the lower courts have generally been
deferential to what they identified as an exercise of a patent holder’s
lawful right to exclude. Much has been written about which side is
correct, yet there has been relatively little exploration of the source of
the persistent disagreement.
Building off of Henry Smith’s property rights theory and the
cognitive miser literature from Peter Lee, this Article explains that
the long-standing disagreement stems from the judiciary’s application
of information-cost-saving rules. Courts adopted a formalistic
approach that would almost invariably uphold a reverse payment
settlement because they tend to apply bright-line rules when dealing
with property rights, and they are prone to adjudicate complex patent
and patent-related cases in ways that economize on the costs of
information processing. Although the Supreme Court resolved the
disagreement by adopting a more information-demanding rule of
reason approach in FTC v. Actavis, the cognitive miser phenomenon
will continue to affect how courts adjudicate antitrust challenges to
reverse-payment settlements.

† Associate, Sidley Austin LLP; J.D., Harvard Law School; MPH, Harvard School of
Public Health; A.B., Dartmouth College. The author would like to thank Professors Ben Roin
and Henry Smith for comments on earlier drafts and Professor Adam Mossoff and Robert Leider
for their thoughtful input. The views expressed in this article are exclusively those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect those of Sidley Austin LLP and its partners.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a sharp public policy debate over
the access to and the cost of prescription drugs. Maximizing the use
of generic drugs—which not only cost substantially less than their
brand-name counterparts but also deflate the price of the branded
versions as well1—promises to be a critical component in the fight for
an affordable price tag on healthcare. When generic producers seek
to enter the market before the expiration of the branded company’s
patent, the patent holder has the opportunity to enforce its patent
rights by filing suit for infringement. The disagreement frequently
ends in settlement, and a recent trend is for the settlement to contain
an agreed-upon future entry date for the generic drug and a “reverse
payment,” so named because it is a payment by the alleged victim, the
patent holder, to the alleged patent violator.2 The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) labels such settlements “pay for delay” because it
contends that these agreements represent strategic, collusive behavior
between firms and reduce competition by generic manufacturers.3
Others have defended reverse payment settlements as holding the
potential for net procompetitive effects.4 Determining the appropriate
level of antitrust scrutiny implicates a complex intersection between
patent and antitrust law. The topic has taken on even more
significance since the Supreme Court’s recent holding in FTC v.
Actavis, which requires courts to “strike [a] balance” between “patent
and antitrust policies” by applying a rule of reason analysis to
1. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT
EXPIRATION:
AN
FTC
STUDY
9
(2002),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-prior-patentexpiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
2. Henry N. Butler & Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Policy Reversal on Reverse Payments: Why
Courts Should Not Follow the New DOJ Position on Reverse Payment Settlements of
Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 96 IOWA L. REV. 57, 60 (2010).
3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS
BILLIONS
3
(2010),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-payoffs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
See also Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 75,
91-92 (“As long as monopoly profits are greater than joint duopoly profits, the monopolist and
the entrant will have an incentive to negotiate in a way that leads to the monopoly level of
output and the monopoly price.”).
4. See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 94-100 (arguing that reverse payment
settlements can be either procompetitive or anticompetitive, depending on the context, and
outlining six circumstances where reverse payment settlements may have procompetitive
effects); Alan Devlin, Exclusionary Strategies in the Hatch-Waxman Context, 2007 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 631, 647-56 (2007) (describing harms to competition and general welfare that would result
from categorically prohibiting reverse payment settlements).

JENNY

4/2/2014 11:01 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

234

[Vol. 30

antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements.5
The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis follows years of legal
challenges by both third-party payers and the FTC. The FTC’s
suspicions regarding the anticompetitive effects of reverse payment
settlements propelled it into a union with the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), with both agencies ultimately
advocating for the application of a “presumptively illegal” framework
of analysis. Although the Third Circuit recently did adopt such a test,
over the past decade the vast majority of courts—citing the unique
legal status of patents as lawful rights to exclude—have upheld
reverse payment settlements under a deferential bright-line rule. A
gulf existed for years between the approaches of the FTC and DOJ
(antitrust agencies) and the courts. As a result, the Supreme Court in
Actavis resolved not just an inter-circuit split, but an
intergovernmental stalemate as well.
Although the Supreme Court settled the dispute as a legal matter,
it is still important to understand as a conceptual matter the
underlying causes of the starkly different legal rules urged by the
antitrust agencies on the one hand and actually adopted by the courts
on the other, because the source of the disagreement will continue to
impact how courts adjudicate challenges to reverse payment
settlements. Courts were subconsciously swayed toward adopting a
deferential, bright-line rule for two reasons, both related to
economizing information costs. First, such a rule is consistent with
the judiciary’s broader inclination to apply bright-line rules to
disputes over property rights, such as patents. Second, the judiciary’s
decision to stick with their deferential bright-line rule in place of the
agencies’ proposals is a reflection of the cognitive miser theory,
which predicts the subconscious tendency of humans to apply brightline rules as a way of efficiently processing dense, complex
information. Professor Peter Lee has traced the influence of the
cognitive miser phenomenon in the Federal Circuit’s general
approach to adjudicating patent disputes.6 Building on his work, this
Article illustrates that the cognitive miser phenomenon is not an
isolated feature of patent infringement suits, but rather has played a
substantial role in antitrust litigation involving patents. Just as the
cognitive miser theory explains the Federal Circuit’s penchant for
formalism, so too does it contribute to the overwhelmingly rejection

5.
6.

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010).
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by the lower courts of the antitrust agencies’ proposed frameworks in
favor of a bright-line rule tending to uphold reverse payment
settlements.7
Part I introduces the cognitive miser phenomenon as an
explanatory tool in the judiciary’s approach to patent law. This
section also discusses the judiciary’s more general propensity to apply
bright-line rules when dealing with property rights. The mental
shortcuts associated with the cognitive miser phenomenon enable
judges to economize on their own information costs when they
adjudicate patent disputes; relatedly, when courts apply bright-line
rules to property rights, they provide clear signposts as to the contours
of these rights, which allows third parties to economize on
information costs. Both tendencies have played a substantial role in
the courts’ overwhelming insistence on applying a permissive brightline rule, despite increasingly vocal insistence from the antitrust
agencies that such an approach harms consumers.
Part II provides an overview of the regulatory structure within
which reverse payment settlements are formed. Familiarity with this
regime is critical to understanding both the incentives underlying the
formation of reverse payment settlements, as well as the judiciary’s
justification for its approach.
Part III discusses the judiciary’s rejection of the FTC and DOJ’s
initial proposals. During these early years, both antitrust agencies
settled on different versions of a rule of reason balancing test.
Neither approach gained adherents among the federal courts. The
cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the courts’ rejection of these
nuanced, intensive analyses in favor of a bright-line rule. While the
cognitive miser theory was a contributing factor during this phase, the
rule of reason proposals faced an additional hurdle, in the form of the
background tendency of courts to apply bright-line rules to disputes
over property rights.
Part IV analyzes the final evolution of the FTC and DOJ’s
arguments and their continued lack of success in the courts. This
latest impasse was even more singularly driven by the cognitive miser
phenomenon. Since 2009, both the FTC and DOJ have coalesced
around a legal framework that would deem reverse payment
settlements presumptively illegal. Despite the antitrust agencies’

7. Lee explicitly distances himself from the idea that courts are intentionally
sidestepping engagement with thorny patent law issues. Id. at 28-29. Likewise, the judicial
enthusiasm for a deferential bright-line rule should be viewed as an unconscious manifestation
of judges acting as cognitive misers.
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unified support around a fairly bright-line alternative, courts, at least
until Actavis, continued to provide reverse payment settlements with
room to grow. The cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the courts’
chosen path. The rule that the courts selected not only entails less
technological engagement than the antitrust agencies’ suggestions, but
it preserves opportunities for private resolution of patent disputes,
thereby preventing an influx of additional patent suits into federal
court.
Part V discusses the road forward in the wake of Actavis. The
Court acted in accord with its recent trend in the patent law context of
replacing appellate court formalism with more flexible, but
cognitively burdensome, multifactor tests. Understanding how courts
are particularly prone to applying information-cost-saving rules in
patent-related cases will be useful because it offers clues as to how
courts will apply rule of reason to these antitrust challenges.
I.

COURTS AND INFORMATION-COST-SAVING RULES

Many scholars have criticized the Federal Circuit for being too
formalistic in its adjudication and succumbing to an overreliance on
bright-line rules.8 Recently the Supreme Court has echoed this
criticism as well, striking down formalistic Federal Circuit rules in
favor of more holistic standards.9 The significant cognitive burdens
associated with the technological intricacies of patent litigation led
Professor Peter Lee to hypothesize that the Federal Circuit’s turn to a
rule-bound, formalist approach to adjudication is an expression of the
cognitive miser theory.10
This social psychology theory focuses on the natural tendency of
humans to utilize mental shortcuts, such as presumptions and brightline rules, in areas of informational complexity in order to maximize

8. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of
Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1225 (2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme
Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J.
1 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003).
9. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’ A categorical rule denying
patent protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the
purposes of the patent law.’” (citations omitted)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
419 (2007) (“Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and
when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content
of issued patents.”).
10. Lee, supra note 6, at 26-27.
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their inevitably bounded ability to comprehend new information.11
As Lee explains, “In ‘systematic’ processing, individuals exert
considerable cognitive effort to understand information inputs. In
‘heuristic’ processing, on the other hand, individuals rely on more
easily accessible factors such as the identity of the information source
or other ‘cues’ to reach conclusions.”12 Particularly in areas of
uncertainty, such as where concepts are new and difficult to
understand, we are all more likely to use heuristic processing to
facilitate decision-making.13 Federal Circuit formalism—such as the
“TSM” test, which asks judges to look to a finite number of
categories for a fairly explicit indication of obviousness14—correlates
with “inquiry-truncating” rules that reduce technological
engagement.15 Applying bright-line rules rather than standards limits
the degree to which judges must grapple with, and comprehend, the
ever-more-complex details of disputed technologies16 and nullifies
some of the heavy information costs of wading through a patent
dispute.17
The cognitive miser theory has explanatory power beyond pure
patent infringement suits or the Federal Circuit’s docket. Patent law,
as the rare intersection between law and science, presents unique
challenges for judges who do not have scientific training.18 Indeed,
judges have publicly acknowledged the difficulties presented by

11. Lee, supra note 6, at 25-29. Cf. Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do
Judges Maximize? (the Same Way Everybody Else Does—Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in
Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 Emory L.J. 83 (2002) (arguing that judicial opinions in securities
fraud cases “commonly rely on rules of thumb-decisionmaking heuristics” due to institutional
constraints involving “limited cognitive capabilities, resource constraints, and a judicial desire to
move cases off the docket in an acceptable fashion”).
12. Lee, supra note 6, at 21.
13. Id. at 22-23.
14. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010)
15. Lee, supra note 6, at 33-41.
16. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1183 (2002) (describing how the Federal Circuit has applied “what are
nominally the same legal rules” quite differently based on what industry the patent is situated
within, which has caused district courts to similarly “apply[] the Federal Circuit rules in
different ways depending on the technology at issue”).
17. See Lee, supra note 6, at 33-41.
18. See, e.g., Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myraid Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2116 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 115
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912) (“I cannot stop
without calling attention to the extraordinary condition of the law which makes it possible for a
man without any knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such questions as
these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of the resulting evils . . . .”) (Hand, J.).
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“judicial engagement with technology.”19 Drawing on studies
showing that technological information places significant cognitive
burdens on those without applicable background knowledge, Lee
argues that when faced with the intricacies of patent disputes, judges
outside of the Federal Circuit (who generally lack scientific training
and significant patent litigation experience) are placed in a situation
particularly conducive to the adoption of cognitive shortcuts.20 If our
system’s experts unwittingly act as cognitive misers, then our
system’s generalists are even more likely to do so. Although forum
selection has created a concentration of patent suits in certain district
courts,21 patents remain a small percentage of any district court’s
docket and the vast majority of patent cases are managed by district
court judges who, on average, preside over one patent case per year.22
Because appeals from district court decisions “arising under” patent
law are the exclusive purview of the Federal Circuit,23 it is
particularly rare for appellate judges to review patent-related claims.
Therefore, most of the judges faced with challenges to reverse
payment settlements are unaccustomed to patent law and its related
legal issues. Over the past decade, the cognitive miser phenomenon
has significantly impacted the judiciary’s response to arguments from
the antitrust agencies regarding when a reverse payment settlement
should be struck down as anticompetitive. Selecting bright-line rules
to adjudicate cases in this immensely complex intersection of patent
and antitrust law is consistent with judges engaging in heuristic
processing.
The Federal Circuit’s preference for bright-line rules in the
context of patent disputes mirrors the judiciary’s more general
tendency to apply formalistic rules when adjudicating property rights,
although the two trends are driven by distinguishable motivations.
Bright-line rules in property disputes also serve an information-costsaving function, but instead of allowing judges to cognitively
economize, bright-line rules for property disputes primarily allow

19. See Lee, supra note 6, at 9-13 (2010) (collecting comments by members of the
judiciary).
20. See id. at 23-25.
21. Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 405-07 tbl.2
(2010).
22. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency and
Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a Specialized Patent
Trial Court, 24 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 393, 422-23 (2011).
23. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, “Arising Under” Jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 253, 262 (2003).
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third parties to economize, by clearly establishing the contours of a
property holder’s rights. As Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry
Smith have explained, property rights are “in rem—they bind ‘the rest
of the world.’”24 In rem rights involve an identified owner of an
identified resource, and they are generally protected by an exclusion
regime in which the owner is given broad discretion to choose how he
will use his resource, and others will be excluded from engaging in
conflicting uses.25 The information costs related to the type of right
affects how the right is governed: when the population of duty holders
is large, simple rules are needed to “reduce[] the processing costs that
would be high for such a large and anonymous audience.”26 An
exclusion strategy uses “rough signals or informational variables” to
“protect an indefinite class of uses with minimal precision.”27 Courts
are freed from gathering information and then evaluating the
reasonableness of an owner’s use of his property; owners are free to
use their property without justifying their decisions to third parties.28
In sum, the nature of property rights is conducive to administration
through bright-line rules, because such rules allow the rest of the
world to easily identify the contours of the property right at a low
cost.29
Smith contrasts in rem rights with in personam rights, which are
obligations binding only certain identified people, such as those
arising out of a contract between a few definite parties.30 In personam
rights are typically delineated through a governance regime, which
entails the use of more flexible rules to prescribe norms regarding
permitted and restricted uses.31 Governance strategies will be used
when it is cost-effective, from an information-cost perspective, to
24. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 773, 777 (2001).
25. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S454 (2002) [hereinafter Exclusion Versus
Governance]. See also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance,
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 978 (2004) (“On the dutyholder side, the message is a simple one—to ‘keep
out’—and this simultaneously protects a reservoir of sues for the owner without officials or
dutyholders needing to know what those might be.”) [hereinafter Nuisance].
26. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S455.
27. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978.
28. Id. at 983.
29. Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 790. One of the examples Merrill and Smith cite
of a formalistic rule governing in rem rights is “the common law rule that the person in
possession of a resource is presumed to have a property right.” Id. at 803. The presumption of
validity in the patent context would serve a similar function.
30. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S455.
31. Id.
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place a larger informational burden on a few identified people.32
Although property rights are generally governed by an exclusion
regime, governance rules may be added in certain contexts to provide
supplementary fine-tuning.33 One example is when courts evaluate
land use in a nuisance suit.34 This shift from the exclusion side of the
spectrum towards the governance end is more likely to occur as the
value of the resource at issue rises, because the advantages of the
additional precision provided by governance rules will outweigh their
concomitantly weightier information costs.35
It is well-established that patents are a type of property right,36
but the property rights secured by patents are not considered
coterminous with their real property counterparts. For example,
whether patents are property rights protected by the Takings Clause is
an open question,37 and the majority approach is to view patents as
entailing only the narrower right to exclude, versus the more
expansive rights of use, possession, and disposition associated with
real property.38 Nonetheless, scholars have noted that the conceptual
framework associated with real property has influenced the treatment
of patent rights.39 Even the Supreme Court has evoked the intuition
that patents, like other property rights, should be clearly defined,
remarking that, “[L]ike any property right, [a patent’s] boundaries
should be clear. . . . [A] patent holder should know what he owns, and

32. Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 789-90.
33. Exclusion Versus Governance, supra note 25, at S456.
34. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 985.
35. Id. at 989.
36. See 35 U.S.C. 261 (2006) (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”);
see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002)
(characterizing the patent laws as securing “a property right”); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S.
356, 358 (1881) (describing how a patent “confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in
the patented invention”).
37. Compare Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(holding that patents are not property protected by the Takings Clause), with Zoltek Corp. v.
United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Dyk, J., dissenting) (“The en banc court’s
action is also particularly striking insofar as it vacates the earlier Zoltek decision that the United
States is not liable on a takings theory.”). See generally Adam Mossoff, Patents as
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings
Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2008) (arguing that the Takings Clause applies to patents).
38. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 4 (3d ed. 2004); but see
generally Adam Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
321, 374 (2009) (criticizing the “exclusion concept of patents” based on “the more substantive
conceptual content of nineteenth-century patent doctrines”).
39. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75
TEX. L. REV. 873, 895-903 (1997) (book review); Mossoff, supra note 38, at 370-75.
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the public should know what he does not.”40 The real property-patent
relationship is an example of Professor Adam Mossoff’s more general
observation that the “content of a legal entitlement creates a
conceptual framework within which courts craft legal doctrines to
secure the various elements of this entitlement.”41 This insight
predicts that courts will apply bright-line rules when analyzing
reverse payment settlements—regardless of the cognitive challenges
of patent litigation—because these disputes involve a type of right
that courts view as conducive to solution by bright-line rules.
This Part has described the two conceptual factors that entice
courts to use a bright-line rule when confronted with antitrust
challenges to reverse payment settlements. As Parts III and IV will
describe, these two factors alternately played different roles based on
whether the agencies were proposing multifactor balancing tests or
competing versions of bright-line rules. Before proceeding to this
analysis, it is important to provide an overview of the regulatory
framework that has influenced the creation of reverse payment
settlements.
II. REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Reverse payment settlements are created in the shadow of a very
particular regulatory scheme designed not only to guarantee safe
drugs, but also to incentivize their creation in the first place, by
ensuring that intellectual property rights do not stifle competition.42
Indeed many courts and even the DOJ have characterized reverse
payment settlements as a direct result of the incentives created by the
regulatory regime for drug approvals.43 Familiarity with this
regulatory environment is important for understanding the incentives
of branded and generic companies when they challenge a patent or
enter into a settlement terminating such a dispute.
Companies that wish to market a new drug must submit a New
Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA and receive approval to market
the product to the general public.44 NDAs reflect the results of
40. Festo, 535 U.S. at 731. See also Mossoff, supra note 38, at 694-95 (describing how
the Festo Court applied concepts and terminology drawn from real property takings doctrine to
the patent infringement case before it).
41. Mossoff, supra note 38, at 374.
42. See, e.g., Devlin, supra note 4, at 638.
43. See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07; Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1074; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re
Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830).
44. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2010).
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clinical studies and must indicate that the drug is safe and effective
for use.45 The NDA process does not confer patent protection, and
manufacturers must separately navigate the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office’s (USPTO’s) application process.
Patent
information is listed in the FDA’s Orange Book, along with other
details about a drug such as active ingredients.46
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Restoration Act of 1984,
known as the Hatch-Waxman Act (Hatch-Waxman), controls the
process by which generic drugs enter the market.47 A generic
manufacturer is required to submit an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA), which encompasses a far less rigorous
application process as compared to an NDA because while the
product must exhibit bioequivalence to its branded counterpart, it
need not go through the same regimen of clinical trials.48 As part of
the ANDA, the generic manufacturer must also certify that the patent
protection on the generic’s brand-name equivalent does not prohibit
production of the generic.49
Reverse payment settlements are generally preceded by a generic
manufacturer’s submission of a “paragraph IV certification”50
claiming either that the branded manufacturer’s patent is invalid or
the generic product differs from the brand-name equivalent in such a
way as to avoid infringing on the patent.51 After the generic submits a
paragraph IV certification, the holder of the patent at issue is
notified.52 If the branded manufacturer files suit within forty-five
days of notification, then the FDA must initiate a thirty-month stay on
approval of the generic product.53 This thirty-month stay provides the
branded manufacturer with a significant incentive to sue the
paragraph IV filer, regardless of the confidence it has in its case.

45.
46.

Id. § 355(b)(1).
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS (33d ed., 2013).
47. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of Titles 15, 21, 28,
and 35).
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A). See also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CENTER FOR DRUG
EVALUATION AND RESEARCH, SUBMISSION OF SUMMARY BIOEQUIVALENCE DATA FOR ANDAS
(2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/UCM134846.pdf.
49. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2010).
50. So named for its location in paragraph IV of Title 21. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)
(2010).
51. Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
52. Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
53. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The stay can end before thirty months have passed if a court
rules that the patent is either invalid or not infringed. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).
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Generic companies, too, have a significant incentive to file
paragraph IV certifications in the first place. In order to expedite the
entry of generic products, Hatch-Waxman motivates generic
manufacturers to make paragraph IV certifications by giving the first
filer a 180-day period of exclusivity.54 During this time period, other
generic products cannot compete on the market because the FDA is
prohibited from approving their ANDAs.55 The 180-day period
begins to run when the paragraph IV filer initiates “commercial
marketing” of the drug.56 As some courts and commentators have
noted, inviting generic producers to challenge patents has created an
environment in which branded companies bear nearly all of the
potential downside to litigating, while generic companies enjoy nearly
all of the potential upside:
[U]nder the Hatch-Waxman Act, the patent holder ordinarily
brings suit shortly after the paragraph IV ANDA has been filed—
before the filer has spent substantial sums on the manufacturing,
marketing, or distribution of the potentially infringing generic
drug.
The prospective generic manufacturer therefore has
relatively little to lose in litigation precipitated by a paragraph IV
certification beyond litigation costs and the opportunity for future
profits from selling the generic drug. Conversely, there are no
infringement damages for the patent holder to recover, and there is
therefore little reason for it to pursue the litigation beyond the
point at which it can assure itself that no infringement will occur in
the first place.
Accordingly, a generic marketer has few
disincentives to file an ANDA with a paragraph IV certification.
The incentive, by contrast, may be immense: the profits it will
likely garner in competing with the patent holder without having
invested substantially in the development of the drug, and, in
addition, possible entitlement to a 180-day period . . . during which
it would be the exclusive seller of the generic drug in the market.

54. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). See also Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at 7, 57 (“The
180-day exclusivity period thus increases the economic incentives for a generic company to be
the first to file an ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification. Through this 180-day
provision, the Amendments also provide an incentive for generic companies to litigate patents
that may be invalid and to ‘design around’ patents to find alternative, non-infringing forms of
patented drugs.”). If multiple companies file on the same initial day, all will enter the market
together for 180 days. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY
EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 4 (July 2003),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/u
cm072851.pdf.
55. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2010).
56. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I).
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The patent holder’s risk if it loses the resulting patent suit is
correspondingly large: It will be stripped of its patent monopoly.
At the same time, it stands to gain little from winning other than
the continued protection of its lawful monopoly over the
57
manufacture and sale of the drug in question.

As such, branded companies do face significant incentives to settle
and avoid final judgment in a lawsuit that challenges their patent.
Hatch-Waxman was initially susceptible to manipulation if a
generic manufacturer holding the right to a 180-day exclusivity period
delayed the start of its commercial marketing. The FDA was still
prohibited from approving ANDAs for analogous generic products
until the end of the 180-day period, but by failing to initiate
commercial marketing, the first filer prevented the clock from
beginning to tick. A “bottleneck” was created: by not acting on its
exclusivity period, the first filer could block all other generic
producers who filed behind it from entering the market.58 The
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003 (Medicare Modernization Act) amended Hatch-Waxman to
prevent the creation of bottlenecks. 59 The first paragraph IV filer
must market the drug within seventy-five days of FDA approval of its
application or within thirty months of filing, whichever occurs
sooner.60 Both of these deadlines are termed “forfeiture events,” and
if the first filer does not market its drug in time, it loses the 180-day
exclusivity period.61 While this modification has the salutary benefit
of avoiding the bottleneck issue, the exclusivity period evaporates
forever: if the first filer triggers a forfeiture event, none of the
subsequent generic filers are eligible for the 180-day exclusivity
period.62 The availability of the exclusivity to only the first filer, and

57. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2006). See
also Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 (11th Cir. 2005) (calling the
Commission’s insistence that the parties could have settled, sans reverse payment, on an earlier
entry date a “myopic” proposition); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F.
Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); William J. Newsom, Exceeding the Scope of the Patent:
Solving the Reverse Payment Settlement Problem Through Antitrust Enforcement and
Regulatory Reform, 1 HASTINGS SCI. AND TECH. L.J. 201, 227-29 (2009).
58. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at viii; Prepared Statement of the Federal
Trade Commission: Hearing on Barriers to Generic Entry Before the Special Committee on
Aging, 20-21 (July 20, 2006) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
59. Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2010).
61. Id. §§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)-(ii).
62. Id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii).
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not the first generic entrant, has implications for the impact of reverse
payment settlements on generic entry. If a brand-name manufacturer
and a generic entrant form a reverse payment settlement, the timing of
the resulting arrangement tends to create a forfeiture event. Although
other generic companies can subsequently file paragraph IV
certifications and challenge the patent, the incentives for doing so are
significantly lower without the later reward of exclusivity.63
Because Hatch-Waxman’s regulatory structure was intended to
incentivize generic entry, the FTC is particularly attuned to
allegations that companies are manipulating Hatch-Waxman to
minimize or delay entry of generic products. FTC investigations of
settlements between brand and generic manufacturers first became
public in 1999, and the Agency released its first major study on the
issue in 2002.64
The study examined settlements between
pharmaceutical companies since 1992 and concluded that of the
twenty final settlements related to ANDA litigation, nine involved
payment from the branded manufacturer to the generic.65 Bothered by
this trend, the FTC study requested legislation that would require
brand and generic manufacturers to submit copies of their settlement
agreements to the FTC.66 This request was granted in 2003 as part of
the Medicare Modernization Act, and the FTC began compiling
annual summaries of reverse payment settlements.67
Reverse payment settlements have occurred with increasing
frequency over the past decade, and FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz has
described them as “almost an epidemic.”68 Between 2004 and 2009,
sixty-six settlements between branded and generic pharmaceutical

63. C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Settlement as a Regulatory
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 131-32 (2006) (arguing reverse payment settlements
remove the “most vigorous competitor” from the field, leaving only less motivated subsequent
filers to challenge the patent). The majority and dissent in Actavis sparred over the extent to
which these incentives are truly lowered so significantly that a generic without an opportunity to
obtain the 180-day exclusivity period would lack sufficient incentive to file a paragraph IV
certification and attempt to enter the market prior to the patent’s expiration. Compare id. at
2246 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting) with FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235 (2013).
64. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
65. Id. at 31.
66. Id. at vi.
67. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, SUMMARY OF
AGREEMENTS
FILED
IN
FY
2
(2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-tradecommission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/fy2005drugsettlementsrpt.pdf.
68. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Testimony: Stopping “Pay-for-Delay” Drug
Settlement Agreements is a Top Competition Priority (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/07/antitrust.shtm (on file with author).
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companies involved a payment from the branded company and an
agreement by the generic to forego entry until some date in the
future.69 During this time period, the settlements occurred with
rapidly increasing frequency—in 2004, there were zero, and by 2009,
there were nineteen.70 Each of the next two years featured roughly
thirty reverse payment settlements.71 The FTC recently calculated
that each reverse payment settlement delays entry of generic
competitors in the patent holder’s relevant market for an average of
seventeen months, with a cumulative resulting cost of $35 billion to
American consumers over the next ten years.72
This Part has explained how the detailed regulatory regime of the
Hatch-Waxman Act forms a backdrop for the antitrust-patent disputes
before the courts. Regardless of whether Hatch-Waxman created
unforeseen incentives for patent litigants to enter into reverse
payment settlements, such adversaries turned co-defendants
undeniably possess unique incentives to do so. The complexity of the
resulting antitrust-patent intersection also provides insight on the
attractiveness of cognitive shortcuts in this context.
III. THE EARLY YEARS: STRUGGLING TO FIND A LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Citing the rising incidence of reverse payment settlements, the
FTC initially sought to have them banned under a per se illegal rule.
The FTC soon abandoned this position when even some of its own
members acknowledged that the harsh bluntness of this rule was illsuited to the complexity of reverse payment settlements. In its place,
the FTC advocated a more flexible rule of reason inquiry. The courts
rebuffed this approach as well. Rejection of a rule of reason standard
is directly consistent with the cognitive miser phenomenon. An

Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 1.
Id.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED
IN
FY
2
(2011),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-tradecommission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-modernization/1110mmaagree2.pdf.
72. Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 2. But see BRET DICKEY, JONATHON ORSZAG,
& ROBERT WILLIG, A PRELIMINARY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE BUDGETARY EFFECTS OF
PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS ON “REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS” (2010), available at
http://compass-lexecon.s3.amazonaws.com/prod/cmsdocuments/f72bfed6f1de5f73/Dickey_Orszag_Willig_CBO.pdf (disputing the reliability of the
FTC’s calculations in its 2010 study); see also Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent
Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 307-08 (2011) (explaining why prohibiting
settlements may not necessarily result in lower drug prices).
69.
70.
71.
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additional force was also at work during this time period, namely the
fundamental mismatch between the rule of reason and the type of
rules traditionally used in the adjudication of property disputes.
A. The Rise and Fall of a Per Se Illegal Rule
The Sixth Circuit was the first appellate court to reach the merits
of an antitrust challenge to a reverse payment settlement, and it struck
down the settlement as per se illegal.73 The case, In re Cardizem, was
a suit brought by third-party drug purchasers, and it challenged an
interim settlement that included a reverse payment.74 Among other
terms of the deal, the generic company—who had been the first to
file—promised not to relinquish or transfer its 180-day period of
exclusivity, ensuring (under the pre-Medicare Modernization Act
regime) that a bottleneck would be created.75 Even though the
statutory thirty-month stay ended before the resolution of the
litigation and the generic company’s product had received FDA
approval, the generic did not bring the drug to market.76 The crux of
the plaintiffs’ claim was that, but for the payments from the branded
to the generic company, the latter would have introduced its product
much sooner.77 The district court held that the agreement was per se
illegal as a horizontal market division, and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed.78
The FTC was not involved with In re Cardizem, but it did
endeavor to broaden the adoption of the per se illegal rule. Shortly
after the In re Cardizem district court decision, the FTC brought a
complaint against Schering-Plough Corporation (Schering) and two

73. Two years before this case, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals did review a challenge
to the same reverse payment settlement, but only in the context of standing to challenge the
settlement. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 807-10 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
74. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 899-900 (6th Cir. 2003).
75. See id. at 902.
76. Id. at 903.
77. Id. at 904.
78. Id. at 905-07. Categories of restraints of trade that always or almost always have
anticompetitive effects will be deemed “per se” illegal. Regardless of any competitive
justifications, courts will assume they are an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the
Sherman Act. “As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had
considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason.”
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886-87 (2007) (citation
omitted).
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would-be generic producers of a Schering product called K-Dur.79
Although the FTC urged an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to
follow the district court’s decision in In re Cardizem and label the
settlement a per se illegal market division, the ALJ insisted that a per
se framework of analysis was inappropriate.80 Reverse payment
settlements were then still a “novelty,” and the economic impact was
not “immediately obvious,” rendering rule of reason the superior
approach.81
Under the ALJ’s rule of reason framework,82 the FTC was
required to first prove that the settlements had an anticompetitive
effect.83 Because the agreements allowed both generic producers to
sell their drugs prior to the expiration of Schering’s patent, the ALJ
determined that the FTC could only meet its burden of proof by
showing that, absent the settlement terms, these generics would have
entered the market earlier than the terms of the settlement allowed.84
The FTC admitted that there was no proof an earlier entry date would
have occurred, and the ALJ upheld the settlement based on the FTC’s
failure to prove anticompetitive effects.85
The FTC’s complaint counsel appealed the ALJ’s adverse

79. Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., & Am. Home Prods. Corp., 2002 WL
1488085, at *1 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002).
80. Id. at *83.
81. Id. at *84-85. The ALJ also found In re Cardizem to be not particularly persuasive
caselaw because they involved interim agreements, unlike the final settlements in ScheringPlough which ended the dispute between parties, allowing them to reap the oft-cited benefits of
settlement, such as avoiding the cost and uncertainty of protracted litigation. See id. at *84.
82. A rule of reason inquiry is a case-by-case analysis of whether a particular restraint of
trade is unreasonable. “Courts today apply a ‘burden-shifting’ approach in applying full-blown
rule-of-reason analysis: (1) the plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove that the agreement had
anticompetitive effects; (2) if it does, the burden of going forward shifts to the defendants to
establish procompetitive justifications for the agreement; and (3) if the defendants sustain their
burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement outweigh its procompetitive effects or that the procompetitive effects could have
been achieved in a less anticompetitive manner.” JOHN J. MILES, 1 HEALTH CARE AND
ANTITRUST L. § 2A:11 (2013).
83. Schering-Plough Corp., 2002 WL 1488085, at *88.
84. Id. at *89-90.
85. Id. at *90, 98. Even though the two generic versions at issue had received final FDA
approval in November 1998 and June 1999, the ALJ found “no credible evidence” either
manufacturer would have sold their products while still engaged in patent litigation: were they
to later lose the case, these sales would subject the companies to the potentially “dire
consequences” of paying damages based on the sales of their infringing generic. Id. at *92. But
see Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“We also
reject [the generic company’s] argument that any rational actor like itself would not market its
generic drug until the patent infringement suit against it was resolved . . . . A reasonable juror
could conclude that . . . but for the agreement, [the generic] would have entered the market.”).
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decision to the Federal Trade Commission sitting as an appellate body
(Commission).86 Although the FTC’s complaint counsel continued to
urge adoption of a per se illegal rule, the Commission agreed with the
ALJ that rule of reason was the proper approach.87 The Commission
disagreed, however, with the ALJ’s particular method of analyzing
anticompetitive effects within the rule of reason.88 The ALJ had
implied that, absent a court decision on the merits in the underlying
patent litigation, there was no way to discern with sufficient certainty
whether the settlement payments prevented an otherwise earlier
generic entry from occurring—in other words, whether the settlement
had anticompetitive effects.89 The Commission advanced a litany of
reasons for why it was neither necessary nor practical to look at the
merits of the underlying patent litigation when weighing the
anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement.90 Primarily,
the Commission was concerned that this type of ex post inquiry was
“unreliable” and risked a chilling effect on future settlements.91
The Commission instead wanted the focus to be on the generic
entry date that would have prevailed in “a differently crafted
settlement” between the parties, namely one without a reverse
payment.92 When parties select a future generic entry date in
isolation, without any money changing hands, the Commission
viewed this date as reflecting the parties’ estimations of the strength

86. The FTC holds a unique role as both prosecutor and judge. After the FTC brings a
complaint to its own ALJ, complaint counsel for the FTC may appeal the initial decision of the
ALJ back to the Commission. See 24 AM. JUR. Defending Antitrust Lawsuits § 16 (1977).
87. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. 956, 971-72 (2003).
88. Id. at 964-65, 992.
89. Id. The respondent drug companies had also argued that “proof of anticompetitive
effects requires proof on the merits of the underlying patent claims.” Id. at 992.
90. Id. at 969, 998. When the Supreme Court in Actavis mandated application of the rule
of reason, it was notably more sanguine about the role of a mini patent trial, explaining that it
would not “require the courts to insist . . . that the [FTC] need[s] to litigate the patent’s validity,”
but leaving open the possibility that some courts may wish to engage in this analysis when
applying rule of reason. See FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237-38 (2013). But see Sumanth
Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement Agreements, in 3 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST
LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2131 (2008). Addanki and Daskin argue
that evaluation of the anticompetitive effects of a reverse payment settlement “must consider the
likely outcomes under litigation,” but that such an inquiry into the underlying patent litigation
would be significantly less burdensome than a full trial, because a court need only determine
whether the entry date was later than the expected time of entry resulting from litigation. Id.
For example, if a settlement split the remaining patent period in half—allowing generic entry at
the midway point of the remaining period of patent protection—then a court need only
determine whether the patentholder was less than fifty percent likely to have prevailed at trial.
91. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 997-98.
92. Id. at 994.
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of their own case.93 In contrast, an agreement on a future entry date
combined with a payment from the patent holder to the generic
indicates “there must have been some offsetting consideration.”94
Unless there was some additional consideration given to the branded
manufacturer, “it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the
payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the
date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise.”95
Complaint counsel for the FTC conceded that if it failed to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the reverse payment “exceeded,
by a substantial amount,” the branded company’s reasonable
estimation of the value of the consideration received from the generic,
then the FTC would have failed to prove anticompetitive effects.96
During its appellate review, the Commission has the power to
make additional findings of fact,97 and the Commission found that the
amount of money Schering gave to the generic companies was
unreasonably high in light of the consideration supposedly received
by Schering.98 This created a prima facie case of anticompetitive
effects, shifting the burden to the respondent companies to establish
the settlement’s offsetting procompetitive effects.99 The Commission
found that the settlements failed a rule of reason inquiry because the
companies could do no more than “suggest hypothetical benefits.”100
After the Commission refused to apply a per se illegal rule, the FTC
halted its efforts to spread the Sixth Circuit’s rule.101 Courts, too,
began adopting a new approach.
Although this bright-line rule is certainly consistent with the type
of rule courts typically apply to property rights, its simplicity makes
93. Id. at 987. But see Einer Elhauge & Alex Krueger, Solving the Patent Settlement
Puzzle, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 283, 313-22 (2012) (arguing that even settlements with a
predetermined future entry date but no reverse payment are more likely than not
anticompetitive).
94. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 988.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1004.
97. AM. JUR. supra note 86. Appellate review of this fact-finding is performed under the
traditional deferential standard of review. See FTC v. Ind. Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
454 (1986) (“[A reviewing] court must accept the Commission’s findings of fact if they are
supported by ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’”).
98. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 1002-04, 1053.
99. See id. at 988, 1002.
100. Id. at 999, 1002.
101. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 37-38, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (abandoning its previous emphasis on the propriety of a per se standard
and explaining it would work within a rule of reason framework).
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its unpopularity seem inconsistent with the cognitive miser
phenomenon. Yet even as the Commission viewed reverse payment
settlements with skepticism, it recognized that their potential
procompetitive effects rendered them ill-suited for per se illegal
treatment.102 As the Supreme Court has explained, “the per se rule is
appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with
the type of restraint at issue, and only if courts can predict with
confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances
under the rule of reason.”103 The antitrust agencies have since
acknowledged that the categorical harshness of a per se illegal rule is
not appropriate in this context.104 The cognitive miser phenomenon
predicts the adoption of heuristics and mental shortcuts; it does not
predict the adoption of modes of analysis recognized as inapplicable.
Furthermore, the judicial rejection of the per se illegal rule has been
in favor of an almost equally bright-line rule, the choice of which, as
will be discussed below, can largely be explained by the cognitive
miser phenomenon.
B. Courts Reject Rule of Reason in Favor of (Almost) Per Se
Legal
After the per se illegal rule lost steam, the FTC began to work to
convince courts to adopt an approach similar to the rule of reason
analysis that the Commission had applied in Schering-Plough. The
FTC’s rule of reason framework was premised on a view of patent
protection as “probabilistic”: a patent-holder’s ability to exclude
others is not absolute; rather, the ability to exclude is a function of the
odds that the patent holder can successfully invoke the patent to
exclude competitors.105 In other words, the expected length of patent
protection must be discounted by the possibility that it cannot be
successfully wielded by the holder to fend off challengers.106 The
102. Schering-Plough Corp., 136 F.T.C. at 971-72.
103. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007)
(internal citations omitted).
104. See J. Thomas Rosch, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the American
Conference Institute’s Paragraph IV Disputes Conference (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/rosch/111207paragraphIV.pdf; Brief for the United States in
Response to the Court’s Invitation at 19-20, Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v.
Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851-cv(L)).
105. See Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 101, at 41-42.
106. The view of patent protection as “probabilistic” has sparked contentious debate.
Some commentators agree with the FTC. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, supra note
3, at 75; Keith Leffler & Christofer Leffler, Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response
to Kevin McDonald, 17 ANTITRUST 77 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
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implication of this conception of patents was the type of “what if”
estimation articulated in the Commission’s decision: the amount of
competition achieved by the settlement—the time until generic entry
to market—must be compared with the amount of competition that
“would have been expected absent the payments.”107 This latter level
of competition would be reflected in the parties’ “collectively
expected outcome of litigation,” namely the entry date that would
have been selected in a settlement without a reverse payment (or the
“hypothetical no-payment compromise on the entry date”).108 Under
this logic, payment from a branded company is to purchase delay and
push the entry date back, beyond the date the parties would have
selected in a hypothetical settlement without a reverse payment.
However, the FTC still bore the burden of proof to show a “direct
causal link” between the entry date and the payments; generally, this
would be established by showing that the branded company had
received inadequate consideration in exchange for its payments.109
The FTC’s rule of reason approach was still out of sync with the
judiciary. Courts continued to select a bright-line rule, but now a rule
of near per se legality was quickly gaining converts. In 2003—the
same year that the Sixth Circuit decided In re Cardizem—the
Eleventh Circuit was faced with a challenge to a pair of reverse
payment settlements between Abbott and two generic companies.110
Three years earlier the district court had published an opinion
mirroring the In re Cardizem district court in finding the settlements
to be per se illegal market divisions.111 In Valley Drug the Eleventh

Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 395 (2003) (characterizing patents as a “bundle of uncertain
and imperfect rights”). Others have criticized this view as contradicting the treatment courts
normally accord patents. See, e.g., Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 101 & n.235 (“Rights are
traditionally found when enforceable, but [the probabilistic patent view] argues that whatever
right a patent grants does not reach full strength until actually enforced.”); Marc G. Schildkraut,
Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1033, 104952 (2004); Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Settlements and Antitrust: on “Probabilistic”
Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 68. Courts have consistently
refused to view patent protection as “probabilistic.” See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677
F.3d 1298, 1312-14 (11th Cir. 2012); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). However the Court in Actavis implicitly accepted the theory.
See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (explaining that a payment “likely
seek[ing] to prevent the risk of competition” is itself “the relevant anticompetitive harm”).
107. Brief of Respondent-Appellant, supra note 101, at 42-43.
108. Id. at 44.
109. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005). See also
Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1003-04 (2003).
110. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003).
111. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1348 (S.D. Fla.
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Circuit rejected the lower court’s per se illegal treatment and
pioneered a new approach.112
Because patents give their owners a lawful right to exclude
others, the court explained that competitors’ horizontal agreement to
divide a market did not necessarily create an antitrust violation.113
This was particularly true because patent disputes operate in an
environment with a pre-existing anticompetitive restraint.114 The
judicial inquiry must instead revolve around the “exclusionary power”
of the patent.115 Even if a patent has been ruled invalid, its
exclusionary power must nonetheless be analyzed, because the
reasonableness of the agreement should be judged from the ex ante
perspective of the parties.116 The court expressed concern that
threatening settling parties with antitrust liability if the branded
company subsequently loses the patent suit would discourage
settlement, particularly given the significant uncertainty inherent in
the complexity of patent litigation.117 Although the Valley Drug court
conceded that reverse payments may indicate the patent holder’s lack
of confidence in the validity of its patent, “the asymmetries of risk
and large profits at stake” mitigated the potential strength of such an
assumption.118 Two years after Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit had
an opportunity to revisit the treatment of reverse payment settlements
when the Schering-Plough respondents appealed the Commission’s
decision. In Schering-Plough the Eleventh Circuit reiterated its initial
approach, distilling a three-part test for antitrust liability from Valley
Drug: courts faced with a contested reverse payment settlement must
examine “(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2)
the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the
resulting anticompetitive effects.”119
The Eleventh Circuit was silent as to what determines the scope
2000) rev’d sub nom., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
112. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309.
113. Id. at 1305. Nor did the court agree that rule of reason is appropriate. See id. at 1311
n.27.
114. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066.
115. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1306.
116. Id. at 1306-07.
117. Id. at 1308. See generally James Farrand et. al., “Reform” Arrives in Patent
Enforcement: The Big Picture, 51 IDEA 357 (2011).
118. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1309-10. See also supra Part II.
119. Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1066 (citing Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312).
The court found that the agreements did not exceed the scope of this protection, because the
Commission had inappropriately discounted the ALJ’s findings of fact that the consideration
Schering received in exchange for its payments was in fact reasonable. Id. at 1070-72.
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of a patent’s “exclusionary potential.” The FTC initially interpreted
this test as allowing reverse payment settlements to be virtually per se
lawful so long as the parties agreed on a generic entry occurring no
later than the date of the patent’s expiration.120 The Second Circuit
effectively adopted this interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decisions—and then applied such a test—when it faced its first
reverse payment settlement case in In re Tamoxifen.121 Citing
Schering-Plough, the Second Circuit explained that the unique
environment of patent protection rendered agreements valid if they
did not “exceed the ‘scope of the patent’s protection.’”122 The Second
Circuit’s test is known as the “sham litigation” rule:123 “so long as the
patent litigation is neither a sham nor otherwise baseless, the patent
holder is seeking to arrive at a settlement in order to protect that to
which it is presumably entitled: a lawful monopoly over the
manufacture and distribution of the patented product.”124
Once a court finds that the underlying patent suit is not facially
frivolous, the settlement will be upheld so long as it does not “extend
the reach” of the patent.125 For the In re Tamoxifen court, this inquiry
involved the review of a few easy-to-determine factors. The court
noted that the agreement did not forbid the generic company from
marketing products unrelated to the one at issue in the patent
litigation, there was no bottleneck created,126 and just eight months
after the settlement became effective, the generic would be able to sell
a version of the branded drug under license from the patent holder.127
The Second Circuit agreed with the Schering-Plough panel that
Hatch-Waxman’s structure “encourages” reverse payment settlements

120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15, Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).
121. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 213 (2d Cir. 2006).
122. Id. (quoting Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005)).
123. See, e.g., Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae at 19, Schering-Plough v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).
124. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 208-09.
125. Id. at 213.
126. The settlement required the first generic filer to amend its ANDA and remove its
paragraph IV certification, enabling the FDA to approve subsequently filed ANDAs. Id. at 214.
However, the In re Tamoxifen panel was under the erroneous impression that other generic
manufacturers were not only free, in the absence of a bottleneck, to challenge the patent, but
would be incentivized to do so based on “potentially securing the 180-day exclusivity period
available upon a victory in a subsequent infringement suit lawsuit.” Id. As discussed earlier,
the 180-day exclusivity period is available only to the first filer, not the first successful
challenger.
127. Id. at 213-16.
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as a way to “insure against” loss.128 Furthermore, even if the
underlying patent was weak and the holder was likely to lose its suit,
the court explained that the statutory presumption of a patent’s
validity meant that “settlement is merely an extension of the valid
patent monopoly.”129
Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit had another
opportunity to revisit its posture toward reverse payment settlements.
However, unlike the Schering-Plough court, this subsequent panel
was not so sanguine about the wisdom of its initial decision. The
Second Circuit’s opinion in Arkansas Carpenters was a brief one.
The panel explained that In re Tamoxifen compelled the conclusion
that the agreement at bar did not exceed the scope of the patent and
therefore was not an antitrust violation.130 Although the court
delineated multiple reasons why it might be willing to revisit its
approach, and the FTC submitted an amicus brief in support of a
rehearing,131 the Second Circuit ultimately refused to reconsider en
banc.132
In between the Second Circuit’s decisions in In re Tamoxifen and
Arkansas Carpenters, the Federal Circuit also adopted the sham
litigation rule, in a case known as In re Cipro.133 The In re Cipro
plaintiffs had advanced the FTC’s probabilistic patent protection

128. Id. at 206, 210.
129. Id. at 211.
130. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir.
2010) (per curiam), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011). Although the In re Tamoxifen panel
erroneously believed that a second-in-time generic filer could still obtain the 180-day
exclusivity period, the Arkansas Carpenter court did not refer to this potential reward as being
available to subsequent filers. Yet the court still acknowledged that under the sham litigation
test, the companies had not “manipulate[ed] . . . the exclusivity period.” Id. at 107. This implies
that, at least in the Second Circuit, unlawful manipulation of the exclusivity period will be found
only if a bottleneck is formed, but not if the creation of a settlement erases the existence of a
180-day exclusivity period. The court’s focus, then, is on whether generic companies are
permitted, under the regulatory scheme, to challenge a patent, and not on whether their
incentives have been so diminished by the loss of the exclusivity bounty that they realistically
may never attempt to challenge. Cf. Hemphill, supra note 63, at 126-42 (arguing that
“[p]roblematic settlements are feasible even where there is no formal bottleneck to FDA
approval, because buying off the single firm with bounty eligibility carries a strong prospect of
allocative harm.”).
131. Brief Amicus Curiae of Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Rehearing En Banc,
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 052851-cv(L)).
132. Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir.
2010). Judge Pooler, a member of the Arkansas Carpenters panel, wrote an impassioned dissent
urging Congress or the Supreme Court to step in. Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting)
133. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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theory, but the district court refused to “discount the exclusionary
power of the patent by any probability that the patent would have
been invalid.”134 Similarly, the Federal Circuit explained it was
following the Second and Eleventh Circuits in concluding that absent
“evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation,” a court need
not consider the likelihood of patent invalidity.135 A court’s analysis
properly revolves around “whether the agreements restrict
competition beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent,” where the
outer bounds of a patent’s exclusionary zone were implicitly defined
as a deal that applied only to the allegedly infringing product, forbid
generic entry no later than the expiration date of the patent, and did
not create a bottleneck.136
The FTC was not a party to the In re Cipro litigation, but it
submitted an amicus brief to the Federal Circuit. In this brief, the
FTC began shifting gears towards a framework of analysis that would
make reverse payment settlements presumptively illegal. Portions of
the FTC’s brief continued to advocate for its “hypothetical nopayment compromise on the entry date” test.137 Yet while the FTC
had previously announced that the challenger bore the burden of
proving anticompetitive effects by establishing inadequate
consideration,138 this requirement was omitted from the FTC’s In re
Cipro brief. By arguing that any settlement with a reverse payment
and predetermined generic entry date beyond the ‘hypothetical nopayment entry date’ was anticompetitive, without any particular
showing by the challenger, the FTC was implicitly pursuing a rule of
presumptive illegality. The FTC’s only explicit request, however,
was that reverse payment settlements not be given a per se legal safe
harbor.139
Little has been mentioned thus far of the DOJ, and for good
reason. From 2003 to 2009, the DOJ concertedly distanced itself
134. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 539
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) aff’d in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part sub nom.
Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010).
135. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1336.
136. See id. at 1335-36.
137. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging
Reversal at 16-17, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383).
138. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1068 (11th Cir. 2005). See also
Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 1003-04 (2003).
139. Brief of Amicus Curiae Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging
Reversal at 4, In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383).
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from the FTC’s fight against reverse payment settlements. The DOJ
first weighed in on the issue after the Supreme Court requested its
perspective on In re Cardizem.140 The DOJ admitted that per se
treatment was inappropriate,141 but argued that the case could be
distinguished from the recently-decided Valley Drug and therefore
review was unwarranted.142 In response to a similar request two years
later, the DOJ recommended against the Court granting certiorari in
Schering-Plough.143 Exemplifying their predilection for avoiding the
debate, the DOJ advanced the dubious claim that the Eleventh Circuit
panel had not fully addressed the FTC’s suggested test for liability,
and this potential disconnect made the case a poor choice for
review.144 The DOJ also focused on the absence of any pressing
circuit split, repeating arguments from its In re Cardizem brief
regarding why there was no inherent inconsistency between the Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits.145 The Second Circuit had recently published
its In re Tamoxifen decision, but the DOJ argued this outcome, too,
did not conflict with Schering-Plough, despite In re Tamoxifen’s
explicit adoption of the sham litigation rule and the DOJ’s continued
insistence that the Eleventh Circuit in Schering-Plough had applied a
different test.146 The DOJ similarly encouraged the Court to forego
hearing In re Tamoxifen.147
Although the DOJ’s brief to the Supreme Court regarding In re
Tamoxifen did characterize the sham litigation rule as “insufficiently
stringent,”148 the DOJ was palpably less concerned than the FTC

140. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re Cardizem Antitrust Litig., 332
F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-779). The FTC also signed the brief alongside the DOJ,
perhaps fearful that the Sixth Circuit’s per se framework would be struck down as too extreme,
with a resulting invitation to courts to apply significantly more permissive filters.
141. Id. at 9, 12.
142. Id. at 11-15.
143. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 1.
144. See id. at 15-16. On this point the DOJ appears to be on shaky footing. It is not
immediately clear how the Eleventh Circuit panel misunderstood or otherwise failed to engage
with the FTC’s suggested test for liability: the court noted and rejected the Commission panel’s
reliance on “the entry dates that ‘might have been’ agreed upon in the absence of payments as
the determinative factor.” Id. This inquiry is what the FTC, in its brief, had urged the Eleventh
Circuit to focus upon. Compare Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005)
with Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th
Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972.
145. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 16-18.
146. Id. at 18-19.
147. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 1, In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830).
148. Id. at 1, 12-13.
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about the potential anticompetitive effects of reverse payment
settlements. The DOJ departed from the FTC not just in terms of the
extent of their skepticism, but doctrinally as well. In contrast to the
FTC’s subjective rule of reason approach—focused on the parties’
expected outcome of the litigation—the touchstone of the DOJ’s test
during the Bush administration years was an objective analysis of the
parties’ ex ante chances of winning the underlying patent litigation.149
Yet despite floating this alternate rule of reason test in its briefs to the
Supreme Court, none of the lower courts ever adopted this proposal.
C. Explanations for Judicial Rejection of the Rule of Reason
Framework
1. Judicial Rejection Cannot be Explained by Mere
Disagreement with the Antitrust Agencies’
Particular Rule of Reason Tests
One could posit that courts and the antitrust agencies were
unable to see eye-to-eye during the rule of reason phase because
courts viewed the agencies’ particular proposals as doctrinally flawed.
For example, courts may have been skeptical of some of the
presumptions undergirding the FTC’s rule of reason test. The FTC
insisted that the generic entry date in a hypothetical settlement
without a reverse payment would be an accurate proxy for the parties’
expectations of the outcome of the underlying patent litigation.150 But
the presence during negotiation of varying degrees of risk aversion
undercuts the FTC’s implicit assumption that there are no benign
reasons for selecting an entry date earlier than the one expected as a
result of litigation. Particularly where substantial existing business is
tied to a patent, the risk of “losing it all” in litigation may cause the
patent holder to select an earlier entry date, simply because the
additional certainty is worth sacrificing a mere possibility of even
later generic competition.151 In adopting the sham litigation rule,
149. Id. at 12; Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11 & n.1.
The DOJ did not fully elucidate the role its “limited examination of the merits of the [patent]
claim” would take, other than to encourage courts “at a minimum” to conduct such an inquiry
when applying the rule of reason. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note
147, at 12-13.
150. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003).
151. See Sumanth Addanki & Alan J. Daskin, Patent Settlement Agreements, in 3 ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 2127, 2131 (2008);
Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1060-62; see also FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244-45
(2013) (Roberts, C.J. dissenting); but see Elhauge & Kreuger, supra note 93, at 44-45 (disputing
the relevance of risk aversion to the determination of which reverse payment settlements are
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several courts have cited an analogous intuition described by Judge
Posner: “It is not ‘bad faith’ to assert patent rights that one is not
certain will be upheld in a suit for infringement pressed to judgment
and to settle the suit to avoid risking the loss of rights. No one can be
certain that he will prevail in a patent suit.”152
The issue of risk aversion is even more salient in this context due
to the disparate risk-to-reward ratios faced by each party during
litigation. In order to incentivize generic entry, Hatch-Waxman
significantly skewed these ratios: the branded company cannot obtain
infringement damages and thus has little upside to litigating, aside
from protecting its existing patent; yet the branded company faces a
devastating downside in the form of losing its patent altogether.153 In
contrast, the generic company will lose only litigation costs if it
proceeds, while enjoying a shot at a substantial upside—exclusive
generic sales.154 The resulting landscape makes litigation a far more
painful option for the branded company, and it may therefore be
willing to accept an entry date that is earlier than it otherwise expects
to occur as a result of litigation. The Commission made a similar
observation during its disposition of the Schering-Plough matter.155
Courts both criticized the FTC’s standard for failing to adequately
account for disproportionate risk156 and made the related remark that

anticompetitive).
152. Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill.
2003); see also In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1338 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 991.); Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1067 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at
991.); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (citing Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 992.).
153. See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206-07.
154. Id. Assuming, of course, the generic is the first filer. Otherwise, the generic
company’s upside is smaller, as simply one of multiple generics in the market.
155. See Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 991 (2003) (“The shift in the
relative bargaining power of the litigating parties may mean—assuming other factors are held
constant—that pioneers will have to accept earlier entry dates in settlement than they would
otherwise have had to do. The baseline for a competitively benign settlement may have shifted.”
(emphasis added)); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, In re
Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830). If risk aversion has
caused the “benign settlement” date to shift to an earlier timeframe, then the reverse payment
could also be seen as purchasing time to regain the entry date that would have prevailed if the
parties were bargaining in a risk-neutral environment. Thus, the reverse payment would just be
purchasing the branded company the time it lost as a result of Hatch-Waxman’s intentional risk
restructuring.
156. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 207; In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.,
544 F.3d 1323, 1333 n.11, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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reverse payment settlements are a natural byproduct of HatchWaxman.157
This intuition that the Hatch-Waxman statutory scheme drives
companies to avoid the risks of litigation and settle seems
incompatible with the FTC’s assumption that risk aversion by the
branded company would not artificially advance a settlement’s entry
date. Yet courts could have overcome any perceived oversight in the
FTC’s arguments by incorporating consideration of risk aversion into
a comprehensive rule of reason inquiry. Instead, courts responded by
rejecting the rule of reason altogether.
The DOJ’s objective rule of reason test—premised on an
assessment of the underlying patent litigation—provided another
option to courts dissatisfied with the FTC’s proposal. The DOJ
floated its version in amicus curiae briefs to the Supreme Court.158
Although these briefs did not fully elucidate the particular analysis
that would drive the DOJ’s rule of reason balancing test, courts still
could have used the DOJ’s suggestions as a foundation for building
their own rule of reason test. Despite skirting the potential pitfalls
related to risk aversion, the DOJ’s approach also never gained
momentum with the lower courts. As with the FTC, if courts disliked
specific aspects of the DOJ’s proposal (namely, assessing the patent’s
validity),159 they could have emphasized other factors. Yet still,
courts responded by completely rejecting rule of reason.
The judiciary simply distanced itself from the rule of reason
when adjudicating these cases.160 Even after declaring that the
dynamics of Hatch-Waxman push companies into settling, the Second

157. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 206-07; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074. The DOJ
acknowledged the same dynamic at play. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at
10, In re Tamoxifen Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-830) (“The resulting
disparity in the litigants’ respective risks may tend to increase the cost of settlement for a patent
holder and make reverse payments more likely, even when the patent holder’s legal claims are
relatively strong.”).
158. See discussion supra pp. 127-28.
159. See In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 203-04 (citing and agreeing with other courts that
rejected the suggestion that they assess the merits of a patent’s validity).
160. When the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the sham
litigation rule, it approvingly noted that the lower court had properly undertaken “a full rule of
reason analysis.” In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2008). However, the Federal Circuit upheld the settlement under the sham litigation rule.
See id. at 1336-37. The apparent discrepancy is reconciled by the Federal Circuit’s conclusion
that where “all anticompetitive effects of the settlement agreement are within the exclusionary
power of the patent, the outcome is the same whether the court begins its analysis under antitrust
law by applying a rule of reason approach to evaluate the anti-competitive effects, or under
patent law by analyzing the right to exclude afforded by the patent.” Id. at 1336.
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Circuit seemed primarily concerned with the “inevitable, lengthy, and
expensive” trial resulting from application of the rule of reason.161
The rejection seems to have more to do with the rule of reason
approach itself than of any particular facet of the antitrust agencies’
proposals.
2. Rule of Reason: Inconsistent with Cognitive Misers and
In Rem Rights
The cognitive miser phenomenon predicts the judiciary’s
rejection of the antitrust agencies’ rule of reason balancing tests. The
concurrent propensity to apply a bright-line rule when dealing with
property rights compounded the effect of the cognitive miser
phenomenon, doubly driving the judiciary away from the antitrust
agencies’ suggestions during their rule of reason phase.
As discussed above, the judiciary’s conceptual link between
patents and real property has affected the way courts analyze patentrelated disputes. The FTC and DOJ’s rule of reason tests, then,
presented a mode of analysis courts viewed as incongruent with the
underlying property right at issue. When courts apply the legal norms
associated with in rem rights, they generally apply rules that “turn on
one or a small number of publicly observable states of fact,”162 which
is a stark contrast to the antitrust agencies’ rule of reason tests. The
merits of an underlying patent suit are quite far from publicly
observable facts, yet disentangling such a suit was the messy
threshold inquiry imposed by the DOJ test. Courts would have to
decide, based on their estimated outcome of a suit that was never
litigated, whether to uphold a settlement as within a patent holder’s
property rights. Such speculation does not make it easy for the patent
holder or the public to know the contours of the property rights at
issue. When presented with disputes over property rights, courts are
accustomed to applying a bright-line rule that avoids specifying
impermissible uses, and therefore this type of inquiry would have
been very unintuitive to courts. The FTC’s rule of reason test was
similarly amorphous in terms of providing guidance to third parties
about the contours of a patent holder’s rights. The rallying cry of the
sham litigation rule, that a patent holder “is entitled to defend the
patent’s validity in court, to sue alleged infringers, and to settle with
them, whatever its private doubts,” 163 is far more in sync with the
161.
162.
163.

In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 212 n.26.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 24, at 803.
Compare In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 210 (2d Cir. 2006)
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typical exclusion rule governing in rem rights than a rule of reason
test.
Implementing either the FTC or DOJ’s rule of reason test also
would have posed a conceptually burdensome task. The judiciary’s
broad repudiation of rule of reason in this context, then, corresponds
with a cognitive miser’s general inclination to instead apply a brightline rule. The DOJ’s test required a mini patent infringement trial as a
threshold determination, a task which is notoriously resourceintensive.164 The FTC’s test was analogously complex. Courts were
instructed to speculate about the parties’ “hypothetical no-payment
compromise on the entry date,” and use this date as a competitive
baseline: any subsequent entry would be purchased protection, and
not supplied by the patent.165 This is a comprehensive, holistic
inquiry, commanding courts to first imagine a settlement that was
never made—one without a reverse payment—and then look to the
subjective views of the settling parties in determining the generic
entry date they would have selected. The plaintiffs and drug company
defendants would conjure up different dates, each side invoking a
boundless set of factors to buttress their estimate. Furthermore, it
seems likely that the parties would use the merits of the underlying
patent suit as ammunition. The companies would seek to show they
believed there was at least a moderately high chance the patent would
be upheld in court, a perception that would justify selection of a
relatively late settlement entry date. In general, holistic standards
require more intensive interaction between judges and their subject
matter,166 and this test is no exception. Even though its application
would not per se require a plenary assessment of the patent dispute, it
threatens significant judicial engagement not only with the patented
(quoting Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 702 F Supp. 2d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill.
2003)) with, Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978.
164. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (recognizing the
Eleventh Circuit’s “underlying practical concern” that applying antitrust scrutiny to reverse
payment settlements might require a “time consuming, complex, and expensive” litigation
regarding the validity of the patent); Rohm & Hass Co. v. Brotech Corp., 127 F.3d 1089, 1092
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Patent litigation frequently is complex, long, and difficult.”).
165. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44-46, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d
1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae
Fed. Trade Comm’n in Support of Appellants and Urging Reversal at 18-20, In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (No. 1:00-MD-01383).
166. See Lee, supra note 6, at 62; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63
TEX. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984) (“The traditional Rule of Reason falls prey to all of the limits of
antitrust. It assumes that judges can tap a fount of economic knowledge that does not exist, and
it disregards the costs of judicial decisionmaking (including the costs of damning efficient
conduct by mistake or design).”).
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innovation and the challenger’s allegedly non-infringing alternate, but
a host of other factors the parties would call up as ex post support to
justify a hypothetical ex ante selection of an entry date.
Thus while the cognitive miser phenomenon predicts courts
would reject a rule of reason approach in favor of a bright-line rule, it
is only partially responsible for the judiciary’s actions during the rule
of reason period. The tension between a rule of reason framework
and courts’ usual treatment of property was the other major factor
driving the judiciary’s divergence from the antitrust agencies. This
competing influence was removed, however, once the antitrust
agencies began to offer up alternative bright-line rules. The courts’
choice of their particular bright-line rule over these other options—
creating the intergovernmental stalemate the Supreme Court resolved
in Actavis—can be identified as primarily a manifestation of the
cognitive miser phenomenon.
IV. THE QUICK-LOOK ERA
Although they initially advocated rule of reason tests, the
antitrust agencies have since shifted to “quick look,” a framework of
antitrust analysis much less hospitable to defendants. Under the quick
look doctrine, courts conduct an abbreviated analysis. Where a “great
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained,”167
plaintiffs need not establish that the defendant’s conduct actually has
caused or is likely to cause anticompetitive effects.168 Instead, the
burden immediately shifts to the defendant to show procompetitive
justifications for his conduct.169 In other words, the activity is
presumptively illegal. After its rule of reason proposal failed to gain
any traction in the courts, the FTC began to advocate this type of
approach. The FTC’s posture evolved in this direction despite courts
consistently rejecting its comparatively lenient rule of reason test in
favor of the still more indulgent sham litigation rule. The FTC’s
decision to move farther away from the majority judicial approach
was likely due to the FTC’s new partnership with the DOJ. Since
2009, the DOJ has assumed an active role in the fight against reverse
payment settlements. The result is that the DOJ and FTC are now
unified in presenting courts with a presumptively illegal framework.
As Part III will discuss, the quick-look tests offered by the antitrust
167. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
168. Geoffrey D. Oliver, Of Tenors, Real Estate Brokers and Golf Clubs: A Quick Look at
Truncated Rule of Reason Analysis, ANTITRUST, Spring 2010, at 40.
169. See id.
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agencies supply a fairly formalistic approach to resolving challenges
to reverse payment settlements. But the district and appellate courts,
with one recent exception, continued to utilize their own formalistic
approach, the sham litigation rule. The selection of this particular
bright-line rule is a classic manifestation of the cognitive miser
phenomenon.
A. Antitrust Agencies Unite to Advocate for “Quick-look”
Treatment
1. DOJ Sets Forth a Quick-Look Test
In the summer of 2009 the DOJ abandoned its previous
noncommittal attitude, presenting a radically different perspective on
reverse payment settlements in response to a request from the
Supreme Court for input on Arkansas Carpenters.170 Notably, this is
the first post-Bush administration brief submitted by the DOJ on this
topic.171 In contrast to the DOJ’s previous muddled writings on the
topic, the DOJ put forth a specific, and aggressive, test for when
reverse payment settlements should be deemed to violate antitrust
laws.172 Although ostensibly seeking to apply the rule of reason,173
the DOJ’s test avoids a totality of the circumstances inquiry and
instead applies a quick-look test by making reverse payment
settlements presumptively unlawful.174
The DOJ’s test was far more inquiry-truncating than a rule of
reason approach. Reflecting rationales first articulated by the
Commission in its Schering-Plough decision, the DOJ explained that
because the generic entry date parties would choose in the absence of
payment reflects their perception of the likelihood of prevailing at
trial, a settlement encompassing a reverse payment is “naturally
viewed” as purchasing a longer period of exclusion, absent any other
170. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation at 1, Arkansas
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010) (No. 05-2851cv(L)).
171. See Steven Seidenberg, The Flip Side of ‘Reverse Payments,’ ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 1,
2010,
3:00
AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_flip_side_of_reverse_payments/.
172. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
24. This test is reminiscent of the framework of analysis applied by the Commission in its
Schering-Plough decision, except that the antitrust agencies do not bear the burden of proving
inadequate consideration. See Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 988, 991 (2003).
173. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
24.
174. Id. at 9-10.
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consideration provided by the generic manufacturer.175 Based on the
assumption that a settlement featuring both a reverse payment and a
predetermined entry date in the future involved the purchase of
additional exclusion time, the DOJ argued reverse payment
settlements should be considered presumptively anticompetitive.176
Plaintiffs need only make a prima facie showing of the existence of a
reverse payment settlement—by pointing to a settlement that included
both a payment from a branded company to a generic and an
agreement to end litigation and set a future generic entry date—before
the burden shifts to the defendant companies.177
In order for the settlement to survive, defendants must rebut a
plaintiff’s prima facie case, by showing that the settlement did not
result in a level of competition significantly less than they expected to
occur if the patent suit was litigated to a final judgment.178 If the
defendants can show that the amount of the reverse payment is
roughly in line with the litigation costs avoided by the patent holder,
then they have met their burden of proof.179 In contrast, if the amount
of the payment is “greatly in excess” of saved litigation costs, the
defendants will need to show that “despite the reverse payment, the
agreed upon entry date and other terms of entry reasonably reflected
[the brand and generic companies’] contemporaneous evaluations of
the likelihood that a judgment in the patent litigation would have
resulted in generic competition before patent expiration.”180 The DOJ
admitted some reverse payment settlements may lead to a level of
competition greater than what would have occurred as a result of

175. Compare Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note
170, at 21-22, with Schering-Plough et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 987-88 (2003). However, the DOJ’s
test differed from the Commission’s proposed test in that instead of estimating generic entry that
would have occurred under a settlement without a reverse payment, the DOJ suggested that
courts estimate the generic entry that would have occurred if the parties had not settled at all,
and instead the patent litigation reached a final judgment. See Brief for the United States in
Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 28.
176. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170,
at 22. But see Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 88 (arguing that the DOJ’s position that reverse
payment settlements are presumptively anticompetitive rests on erroneous assumptions).
177. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
23, 27.
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id. at 28-29.
180. Id. at 30-31. See also Elhauge & Krueger, supra note 93, at 297-312 (setting forth a
mathematical proof indicating that “when a reverse payment exceeds the patent holder’s
anticipated litigation costs, a court can be confident that” the settlement is anticompetitive,
absent very narrow grounds for rebuttal).
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litigation.181 Such an outcome would only affect claims for damages,
however, and the DOJ did not view it as weighty enough to justify a
rule of reason liability standard.182 The DOJ explicitly disavowed any
type of embedded trial regarding the merits of the underlying patent
litigation, warning that it would “unduly complicate” an antitrust
case.183
The DOJ’s quick-look test explicitly contradicted two positions
the DOJ had made in its earlier, otherwise noncommittal briefs to the
Supreme Court. First, the DOJ had previously noted that a rule of law
which subjects reverse payment settlements to “near-automatic
invalidation” could “potentially frustrate” the ability of patent holders
to exclude competition falling within the scope of their patent’s
protection.184 This concern fell by the wayside when the DOJ
switched to a test with a starting presumption of illegality. Second,
the DOJ had argued that the competing values of patent and antitrust
law merited a test that would objectively calculate the parties’ relative
chances of winning the underlying patent litigation, by looking to an
ex ante assessment of “evidence extrinsic to the settlement.”185 The
DOJ had criticized the FTC’s contemporaneous approach of
imagining a hypothetical no-payment settlement date, because it gave
too much weight to the parties’ own views of their relative chances of
success.186 Starting in 2009, however, the DOJ adamantly rejected
any such “objective” inquiry into the merits of the underlying patent
litigation, instead embracing a subjective quick-look test.187
2. FTC Shifts to Quick-Look
The FTC began its final phase of evolution by introducing a
quick-look test inspired by the DOJ’s earlier objective rule of reason
approach. When hearing In re Androgel, the Eleventh Circuit was
faced with yet another challenge to a reverse payment settlement.188
The FTC attempted to reinterpret and reframe Valley Drug and

181. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
24-25.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 25-27.
184. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 10-11.
185. Id. at 10-12.
186. See id. at 11-12.
187. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170,
at 24-25; see also id. at 26 n.9 (acknowledging “some tension” between the DOJ’s previous
writings and its current views).
188. See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010)
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Schering-Plough as capable of coexisting with a presumptively illegal
test.189 In its brief to the district court, the FTC admitted it had
previously interpreted Eleventh Circuit case law as requiring the same
“end-of-patent-term standard”190 that the Second and Federal Circuits
used.191 The FTC emphasized, however, the “ambiguity” in the
Eleventh Circuit’s past decisions, such that the task of examining the
“scope of the exclusionary power of the patent” did not foreclose
analyzing the strength of the underlying patent as an element of this
inquiry.192 Under this view, a patent that is likely invalid or not
infringed simply does not have the same exclusionary power as a
“strong patent.”193 Thus, although a court facing an antitrust
challenge need not “assess direct evidence of the underlying patent

189. See Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss at 14, In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No.
1:09-CV-00955-TWT).
190. Also referred to as the sham litigation standard.
191. See Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss at 14, In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (No.
1:09-CV-00955-TWT).
192. Id. at 14-15. In its brief to the Eleventh Circuit regarding Schering-Plough, the FTC
had originally read Valley Drug as adopting a rule much like the one it articulated during the In
re Androgel litigation. See Brief of Respondent Fed. Trade Comm’n at 16, Schering-Plough v.
FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688). Under this interpretation, the requirement
to analyze the “exclusionary potential” of the patent mandated an inquiry into “[h]ow successful
the patentee was likely to be in excluding” the generic challenger, in other words, an evaluation
of the merits of the underlying patent litigation. Id. Following Schering-Plough, the FTC
viewed the Eleventh Circuit as adopting the sham litigation rule. See Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 14-15, Schering-Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688).
In its In re Androgel brief, however, the FTC argued that Valley Drug and Schering-Plough
adopted a framework distinct from sham litigation. Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s
Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, supra note 191, at 14. In support of
this contention, the FTC cited Valley Drug’s remand to the district court “for consideration of
the ‘protection afforded by the patents’ based on ‘the likelihood of [the patentee] obtaining such
protections’ at the time of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc.,
344 F.3d 1294, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003)). The FTC also found support for its new interpretation in
the last paragraph of the Schering-Plough opinion, which mentioned the “need to evaluate the
strength of the patent.” Id. (quoting Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1076). Since 2006, the DOJ
had similarly argued that the Eleventh Circuit caselaw allows, or at least does not foreclose, an
inquiry into the strength of the patent. See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra
note 123, at 22-24. The case for ambiguity is made more plausible by the full history of Valley
Drug: after the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for a consideration of the
“exclusionary potential” of the patent, the district court proceeded to analyze the likely outcome
of the pending patent litigation. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d
1279, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Such an inquiry, according to the district court, was mandated by
Valley Drug’s holding; if this was a misconception, the Schering-Plough court did nothing to
correct it.
193. Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 191, at 20.
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claims,” courts cannot disregard “complaint allegations that the patent
was invalid or so narrow that it would not prevent generic entry on its
own.”194 Correspondingly, the FTC articulated a new test consistent
with its updated interpretation of Valley Drug and Schering-Plough: if
an objective analysis of the underlying patent litigation, made at the
time the settlement was formed, indicates it is more likely than not
that the generic product would have ultimately entered earlier than the
date allowed by the settlement terms—either “through final resolution
of the patent litigation or through entry not stopped by a preliminary
injunction”—then the payment “must be seen” as purchasing delay,
and as such, the settlement is unlawful.195
In other words, the FTC attempted to persuade the Eleventh
Circuit that under the first prong of the Valley Drug/Schering-Plough
test—which inquires into the exclusionary potential of the patent—the
court should analyze a patent’s strength in a type of mini-trial, and
use this result to discount the official length of a patent’s protection.
This calculation generates a length of patent protection provided by
the patent itself, and the FTC assumes in a but-for world where the
parties never settled, generic entry on average would have occurred
immediately after the expected length of patent protection. A later
generic entry date under a settlement is presumed to have been
purchased by the reverse payment, in violation of antitrust law (absent
proof by the defendants of offsetting procompetitive effects). This
test harkens back to the DOJ’s original suggestion that courts analyze
the merits of the underlying patent litigation, an inquiry which the
FTC had previously disavowed in favor of a subjective inquiry into
the parties’ expectations regarding generic entry. The difference
between the two is that while the DOJ incorporated this inquiry into a
rule of reason balancing test,196 the FTC suggested it as the starting
point of a presumptively illegal rule.197
The In re Androgel district court refused to consider the scope of
the patent as diminished by the probability that a patent holder would
litigate and lose, describing such a view of a patent’s exclusionary

194. Id. at 1-2, 25.
195. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n at 21-32, FTC v. Watson Pharm.,
Inc., No. 1:09-CV-00955-TWT (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 2012). Alternately, if the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals viewed its precedents as establishing an end-of-patent-term (or sham
litigation) rule, then the FTC urged the court to adopt the “presumptively illegal” rule articulated
by the DOJ in its Arkansas Carpenters brief. Id. at 43-44.
196. See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11.
197. Plaintiff Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Consolidated Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, supra note 191, at 3-4.
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power as inconsistent with the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Valley
Drug.198 In an emphatic opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court, rebuffing the FTC’s invitation for it to engage in the
“turducken task” of “deciding a patent case within an antitrust case
about the settlement of the patent case.”199 The court put aside any
ambiguity about its precedent and explicitly upheld the reverse
payment settlement under the sham litigation rule.200
The FTC’s In re Androgel briefs were written against the
backdrop of the Eleventh Circuit’s relatively extensive experience
with reverse payment settlements. In contrast, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals was contemporaneously facing a case of first impression.
The suit arrived to the Third Circuit following the district court’s
application of the sham litigation rule.201 Notably, that same week,
another district court in the Third Circuit also announced it would
adopt the sham litigation rule.202 Working from a clean slate in the
Third Circuit, the FTC chose to advance the DOJ’s new quick-look
test. 203
For the first time, the efforts of the antitrust agencies were met
with success. The Third Circuit in In re K-Dur adopted a
presumptively illegal test, although it did not rely on the DOJ’s
suggestion to tether the analysis to the settling parties’ subjective
views of the patent litigation’s likely resolution.204 Under the Third
Circuit’s test, any payment from a branded company to a generic
198. In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
199. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012).
200. Id. at 1312.
201. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6,
2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J.
Mar. 25, 2010).
202. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 528-29 (E.D.
Pa. 2010), abrogated by In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
203. Brief of the Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants and Urging
Reversal at 24-26, In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 10-2077 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010); see also
Rosch, supra note 104. While this may seem to be an abrupt change from the “merits of the
patent litigation” quick-look test it was pressing upon the Eleventh Circuit in In re Androgel, the
FTC was making a strategic decision. If the Eleventh Circuit interpreted its earlier ambiguous
“exclusionary potential of the patent” language as encompassing an inquiry into the patent’s
validity, then it could adopt the FTC’s offering—and officially turn away from the sham
litigation rule—without breaking from precedent. Although the FTC gave the In re Androgel
court an opportunity to adopt a quick-look test without explicitly reversing course, the FTC still
had a backup argument. Should the court interpret its prior case law as adopting a sham
litigation rule, the FTC urged it to split with precedent and adopt the quick-look test set forth by
the DOJ in Arkansas Carpenters. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note
195, at 43-44.
204. In re K-Dur, 686 F.3d at 218.
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would be prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation. The settling
parties can overcome this presumption by producing evidence either
of adequate consideration that the branded company received in
exchange for the payment or an increase in competition as a result of
the payment.205 The Third Circuit also confirmed that it would not
look to the merits of the underlying patent litigation.206
The rigorous scrutiny requested by the antitrust agencies and
imposed by the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur stands as an anomaly to
the deferential treatment accorded to patent holders by the
overwhelming majority of lower courts throughout the decade
spanning from Valley Drug up to Actavis. The sham litigation rule’s
popularity even spread to state courts as well. In October 2011, the
California Court of Appeals affirmed an earlier Superior Court
decision applying the sham litigation rule to uphold a reverse payment
settlement as valid under the state’s analogue to the Sherman Act.207
By ultimately requiring “the FTC [to] prove its case as in other
rule-of-reason cases,” the Supreme Court in Actavis adopted what
could be viewed as a compromise between the bright-line rule popular
in the lower courts and the one preferred by the antitrust agencies.208
Although the Supreme Court ended the intergovernmental stalemate,
it is important to understand why the courts selected the approach
they did, because the conceptual factors that propelled courts toward
the sham litigation rule will impact how they structure their rule of
reason analyses.
B. Why did the Courts not see Eye-to-Eye with the Antitrust
Agencies?
The utter lack of common ground between the lower courts and
the antitrust agencies raises the question of why courts maintained—
in the face of increasingly insistent objection from the antitrust
agencies—that reverse payment settlements deserve such permissive
treatment. While doctrinal disagreement with the two quick-look

205. Id. As an example of the latter method of rebutting the prima facie case, the court
cited the scenario where “a modest cash payment . . . enables a cash-starved generic
manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug.” Id.
206. Id.
207. In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 165, 169 (Cal. App. 4th. 2011), review
granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012) (“We hold that a settlement of a lawsuit to enforce a patent
does not violate the Cartwright Act if the settlement restrains competition only within the scope
of the patent, unless the patent was procured by fraud or the suit for its enforcement was
objectively baseless.”).
208. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
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tests could provide at least a partial justification, the cognitive miser
phenomenon offers a persuasive explanation for the adoption of the
sham litigation rule.
1. Judicial Rejection of the Quick-Look Tests Moves
Beyond Doctrinal Disagreement
Under one view, the continued gap between the courts and
antitrust agencies during the quick-look phase could simply reflect
disagreement with either the general appropriateness of quick-look or
the specific iterations proposed by the agencies.
Quick-look is an important tool in the antitrust analysis, but it is
not a multipurpose tool, and courts may have disputed the propriety of
applying quick look in this context. Quick-look should be used only
in limited circumstances, namely “when the great likelihood of
anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.”209 Where a
defendant can articulate “plausibly” procompetitive effects, such that
a court cannot “initially dismiss [them] as presumptively wrong,”
quick-look review is inappropriate.210 Some commentators have
argued that there are credible procompetitive justifications for reverse
payment settlements.211 Even the DOJ has acknowledged the
existence of plausible procompetitive effects.212 Those who criticized
the use of quick-look scrutiny were vindicated when the Court in
Actavis explicitly rejected as inappropriate the FTC’s invitation “to
proceed via a ‘quick look’ approach.”213 Yet courts never relied on
this explanation in their decisions, and even if it was sub silentio
driving their rejection of the quick-look approach, this justification
would not explain why courts chose the sham litigation rule instead.
Even assuming that the quick-look approach constituted the
proper level of scrutiny in this context,214 one could argue that courts
209. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
210. Id. at 775.
211. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 112-13. For these reasons, Butler and Jarosch
argue that the DOJ’s quick-look framework is inappropriate. Id. at 113-14. The authors focus
on both direct and indirect procompetitive effects, such as greater long-term investment and
innovation. See also Christopher M. Holman, Do Reverse Payment Settlements Violate the
Antitrust Laws?, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 489, 504 (2007); Daniel A.
Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and
Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 760-65 (2004) (describing the “innovation costs”
of prohibiting reverse payment settlements); Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1060-67.
212. For an explanation of why the DOJ believes quick-look is appropriate here, see Brief
for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 24-25.
213. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
214. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195, at 18-19
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rejected the quick-look tests advanced by the antitrust agencies
because they were uncomfortable with the premise of these particular
proposals. Both the FTC’s objective quick-look test from In re
Androgel and the subjective quick-look test suggested by the DOJ in
Arkansas Carpenters implicate the concept of probabilistic patent
protection, which has drawn vocal criticism.
Under the objective quick-look test (as presented by the FTC to
the Eleventh Circuit in the Actavis litigation), a reverse payment
settlement would be struck down if a court determines it is more
likely than not that the patent holder would have lost his suit against
the generic.215 Application of this test generates an objective estimate
(as viewed from the time of the settlement’s formation) of the
probability the patent holder would have successfully wielded his
patent in court to exclude a generic challenger. If that probability is
below 50% then the reverse payment settlement is unlawful.216 The
Eleventh Circuit strongly rejected the contention that a patent holder
with a 49% chance of winning its patent dispute—in other words, a
patent holder likely to lose—should be deemed to have a patent with
an exclusionary potential of zero.217 A patent, the court insisted, must
be given its full “potential exclusionary power” when determining the
scope of the right to exclude.218
The subjective quick-look test relies on a similar presumption of
probabilistic protection. Where the settlement’s date of generic entry
does not occur until the patent’s expiration, the defendants have failed
to rebut the prima facie case of anticompetitive effects, even if the
parties to the settlement establish their genuine belief that the trial
court more likely than not would have barred generic entry until the
date of patent expiration.219 The DOJ rationalized this facet of its

(articulating several factors which make reverse payment settlements worthy of the skepticism
attached to quick-look analysis); see generally Elhauge & Krieger, supra note 93.
215. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 195, at 22.
216. In re Androgel involved an appeal from the district court’s grant of defendants’
motion to dismiss, based on an FTC complaint alleging the patent holder was “not likely to
prevail” in its suit against the generic challengers. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298,
1301 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the appeal focused on whether ‘unlikely to prevail’
sufficiently pled an antitrust violation. Id. The implication of the FTC’s test is that when a
patent holder is likely to win its underlying suit, the settlement would not constitute an antitrust
violation. However, the FTC did not discuss the level of scrutiny to be applied in the latter
scenario.
217. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2012).
218. Id.
219. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
29.

JENNY

4/2/2014 11:01 PM

2014] INFO. COSTS & REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS

273

quick-look test by explaining that given multiple settlement cases
involving a generic company with less than a 50% chance of winning,
at least one such case litigated to conclusion would “presumably”
result in the generic challenger winning and entering.220 Therefore, a
reverse payment settlement with entry timed at the patent’s expiration
would be “anticompetitive because it eliminates the possibility of
competition from the generic prior to the expiration of the patent.”221
This argument reflects the assumption, advanced by some economists,
that “consumers have a ‘property right’ to the level of competition
that would have prevailed, on average, had the two parties litigated
the patent dispute to a resolution in the courts.”222 The theory takes a
macro view, aggregating hypothetical potential reverse payment
settlements and emphasizing that even if the patent holder was
significantly more likely than not to prevail in each suit, if all were
litigated, then on average some generic entry would have occurred
prior to settlement. Because consumers have a property right in that
“possibility of competition” prior to the expiration of the patent,
destruction of the possibility is anticompetitive. These arguments are
the flip side of the probabilistic patent protection coin: the probability
a patent will fail to enable its holder to exclude a generic challenger is
the possibility of competition, and this possibility should inure to
consumers’ benefit.
With near uniformity, the lower courts criticized probabilistic
patent protection as incompatible with the rights accorded to patent
holders.223 As one court noted, adopting the “concept of a public
property right in the outcome of private lawsuits” would be
tantamount to imposing an unprecedented “duty to use patent-derived
market power in a way that imposes the lowest monopoly rents on the

220. Id. at 30.
221. Id. at 29-30.
222. See Shapiro, supra note 106, at 396. Carl Shapiro held the position of Chief
Economist at the Antitrust Division of DOJ from 2009-2011. Haas Faculty Serve in Federal
Government,
UNIVERSITY
OF
CALIFORNIA-BERKLEY,
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/faculty/gov.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2013). See also In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(describing the FTC’s “reli[ance] on the economic analysis advocated by Professor Carl Shapiro
regarding consumers’ ‘expected’ gain from the patent challenge”).
223. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2012); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869, at *24–25 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009)
report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. Mar.
25, 2010); but see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
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consumer.”224 Commentators have pointed out that allowing a
plaintiff to leverage even a low possibility of harm into actual harm is
a radical departure from traditional civil burdens of proof, which
require the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was more likely than
not the source of his harm.225 Potentially anticompetitive agreements
are also generally held to this same standard; even if there is a
possibility of diminished competition, the agreement will not be
struck down unless that possibility is more likely than not to occur.226
In contrast, the “probabilistic patent protection” school of thought
effectively condemns an agreement if any possibility of diminished
competition results. Marc Schildkraut, former Assistant Director of
the FTC, has expounded up the unusual nature of this approach:
Consider, first, a merger subject to Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
The parties to the merger freely concede that the merger has no
efficiency benefits. The merging parties are not direct competitors.
There is, however, a 10 percent chance that the acquirer will enter
the acquired party’s market in the next few years. Under the
[probabilistic patent protection theory], the merger should surely
be condemned—there is a 10 percent diminution of uncertain
competition. Of course, antitrust tribunals using . . . traditional
227
civil standards would not condemn this merger.

Applying either of the agencies’ quick-look tests would entail
adopting the probabilistic patent protection theory, including
implications that are arguably incongruous with the standard judicial
approach to antitrust challenges specifically and causation more
generally. Although the majority’s opinion in Actavis was premised
on an acceptance of the probabilistic patent protection theory, the
dissent mounted a fervent attack on the coherence of this theory,
particularly when taken to its logical extensions.228 Courts may have
had valid doctrinal reasons for selecting alternate frameworks.

224. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531–32
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
225. Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 433B cmt. 1 (1965)); see also Schering-Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs., & Am. Home
Prods. Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085, at *1 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002). There are exceptions,
of course, including strict liability and comprehensive statutory schemes, such as the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, which dispenses with the causation requirement for
individuals who suffer certain delineated side effects following administration of a vaccine. See
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1073-74 (2011).
226. Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049.
227. Id. at 1050.
228. Compare FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013), with Schildkraut, supra
note 106, at 2240 (Robert, C.J., dissenting).
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Beyond doctrinal disagreement, the credibility of the antitrust
agencies on the topic of reverse payment settlements may have been
burdened by the judiciary’s sense of whiplash over the past decade.
Both agencies have significantly altered their approaches, generally
with little justification. The DOJ began by vaguely intimating that an
objective assessment of the merits must be utilized as part of a rule of
reason approach.229 It then switched to a subjective inquiry,230
rejecting its previous suggestion to litigate the patent infringement
question as “neither necessary nor appropriate.”231 Not only did the
mode of analysis shift, but the DOJ’s entire attitude transformed.
Initially the DOJ adopted a solicitous posture, noting that the “public
policy favoring settlements, and the statutory right of patentees to
exclude competition within the scope of their patents, would
potentially be frustrated by a rule of law that subjected patent
settlements involving reverse payments to automatic or nearautomatic invalidation.”232 The DOJ later insisted the settlements
should be viewed as presumptively unlawful.233 Although the FTC’s
attitude toward reverse payment settlements has been consistently
chilly, it has undergone a similarly lurching evolution in terms of
suggested frameworks. After a brief stint of advocating a per se
illegal prohibition, the FTC attempted to persuade courts to adopt a
subjective assessment of the parties’ expectations, as embodied in a
“hypothetical no-payment compromise on the entry date.”234 Despite
initially rejecting as deeply flawed any attempts to objectively assess
the merits of the underlying patent litigation,235 the FTC would later
offer up such a test in the In re Androgel litigation, while almost
simultaneously signing on to the DOJ’s new subjective quick-look
test. To the extent these changes signal the speaker’s uncertainty as to
how reverse payment settlements should be reviewed, courts may
have been even more inclined to disregard the antitrust agencies’
offerings altogether.

229. See Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 11.
230. The focus is on a “comparison between competition under the settlement and with
what [the defendants] expected had the patent infringement suit been litigated to judgment.”
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 28.
231. Id. at 24.
232. Brief for Dep’t of Justice as Amicus Curiae, supra note 123, at 10-11.
233. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
10.
234. Brief of Respondent-Appellant at 44, Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056
(11th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-10688-AA), 2004 WL 3557972.
235. Schering-Plough Corp., et al., 136 F.T.C. 956, 998 (2003).
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But even if the strong trend of courts rejecting the antitrust
agencies’ proffered tests could be chalked up to tarnished credibility
or doctrinal disagreement, it would leave unresolved the question of
why courts coalesced around the sham litigation rule as their
particular resolution. This rule is not without its own doctrinal
weaknesses; yet the lower courts tended to respond to criticism by
raising up as a shield both the law’s general preference for settlement
and the specific factors incentivizing settlement between companies
acting under the shadow of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory scheme.236
But settlement is no panacea. Some commentators have attacked “the
standard presumption that settlement should always be encouraged,”
pointing out that settlements bear attendant costs because they can
“reduce the legal system’s ability to distinguish between legitimate
and harmful activities.”237 Criticism of the sham litigation rule
derives from just such a concern, namely that generously allowing
settlement here will fail to deter patent holders from diverting some of
their monopoly profits to potential generic competitors who could,
and otherwise would, legitimately enter the market without infringing
on the patent.238 Courts were persistently undeterred by the
suggestion that this may be one of the areas where settlement imposes
significant adverse spillover effects. As the Second Circuit explained,
settlement in this context is to be encouraged, “even if it leads in
some cases to the survival of monopolies created by what would
otherwise be fatally weak patents.”239 Furthermore, courts generally
sidestepped the issue of whether, despite achieving the traditional
benefits of settlement, the parties’ agreement nonetheless violated
antitrust laws.
The nearly unwavering judicial trajectory in support of the sham
litigation rule is also noteworthy given how little the courts engaged
with allegations of misplaced reliance on the statutory presumption of
validity.240 This presumption is often cited as the reason d’être for
viewing reverse payment settlements as valid and logical extensions
of a patent holder’s right to exclude.241 There is a heightened

236. See, e.g., In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337
(Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211-12 (2d Cir. 2006).
237. Ezra Friedman & Abraham L. Wickelgren, No Free Lunch: How Settlement Can
Reduce the Legal System’s Ability to Induce Efficient Behavior, 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 1355, 1366,
1373 (2008).
238. Id. at 1372 & n.75.
239. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006).
240. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (West 2013) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”)
241. See, e.g., In re Cipro, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211; Schering-
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standard of proof connected to this presumption, and a challenger can
only overcome it by presenting clear and convincing evidence, rather
than a preponderance of the evidence.242 Yet as the Federal Circuit
has explained, the statutory presumption of validity is but “a
procedural device,” serving to place the burden of persuasion on the
alleged infringer.243 As such, when patent holders seek a preliminary
injunction, for example, they cannot rely upon the presumption as
affirmative evidence they will win on the merits.244
Some
commentators have argued that allowing patent holders to obtain
antitrust immunity based on the presumption of validity enables the
statutory presumption to be transformed from a procedural device into
substantive evidence of validity, despite the Federal Circuit’s wellestablished prohibition on such a maneuver.245 In the course of
adopting and applying the sham litigation rule, even the Federal
Circuit cited the presumption of validity but did not engage with this
line of reasoning.246 The Third Circuit identified this same criticism
as one basis for its rejection of the sham litigation rule.247
To the extent the sham litigation rule is premised upon the
presumption of validity, its foundations are even shakier where the
underlying patent suit involves only claims of non-infringement.
Although courts have cited the statutory presumption of validity as a
factor compelling their adoption of the sham litigation rule and
corresponding rejection of the concept of probabilistic patent
protection, there is no statutory presumption of infringement or noninfringement. Consequentially, when a branded company files a suit
alleging infringement, it bears the burden of proving that the

Plough v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11th Cir. 2005).
242. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2247 (2011).
243. New Eng. Braiding Co. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 64 (2009); Joseph Vardner, Note, The Statutory
Presumption of Patent Validity in Antitrust Cases, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 225, 231-35 (2011).
See also Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at 1819 (citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713
F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Other commentators have argued that it is particularly
misguided to place such great reliance on the presumption of validity because flaws in the patent
approval process create significant doubts about the validity of the underlying patent in the first
place. See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. L. REV.
323, 333-36 (2008).
246. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
247. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012).
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competitor’s product infringes on its patent.248 The rationale for
rejecting probabilistic patent protection does not fully translate to a
reverse payment settlement borne out of allegations of infringement,
rather than invalidity.
This tension was particularly palpable in In re K-Dur.249 The
plaintiffs argued their case merited application of a rule other than
sham litigation because infringement, and not validity, was the
original point of contention between the branded and generic
companies.250 Surely, they explained, the absence of an infringement
presumption implies there is but a probability the generic would be
kept off the market, and therefore courts should view patent
protection as probabilistic.251 Despite acknowledging the lack of a
statutory presumption of infringement, the In re K-Dur district court
refused to “discount the exclusionary power of [the] patent based on
the possibility that it was not infringed by the [generic products].”252
The court’s rationale for this position amounted to little more than
pointing out that, despite the absence of a presumption of noninfringement, there is no statutory presumption of infringement, and if
the court discounted the patent’s exclusionary power by the likelihood
of non-infringement, it would be tantamount to assuming
infringement existed.253 The FTC had also raised this point in
Schering-Plough and In re Cipro, but both courts of appeals rejected
the argument and insisted on applying the sham litigation rule,
regardless of the type of underlying claim.254 This line of thinking
has been particularly criticized because excluding non-infringing
drugs cannot lie within a patent’s exclusionary scope.255 The Third
248. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
249. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG), 2009 WL 508869, at *25 (D.N.J.
Feb. 6, 2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652 JAG, 2010 WL 1172995
(D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010), rev’d 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. The FTC argued in Schering-Plough that because Valley Drug’s underlying patent
litigation dealt with a claim of invalidity and Schering-Plough’s dealt with infringement, the
Eleventh Circuit should analyze the latter under a framework distinct from Valley Drug; the
court disagreed. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1075-76 (11th Cir. 2005). In re
Cipro dealt with an underlying patent suit involving both claims of invalidity and noninfringement, but the Federal Circuit panel did not differentiate between the two types of suits,
and instead broadly held that unless the litigation was a sham, inquiry into the patent’s validity
was inappropriate. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1328, 1337.
255. See, e.g., Catherine J.K. Sandoval, Pharmaceutical Reverse Payment Settlements:
Presumptions, Procedural Burdens, and Covenants Not to Sue Generic Drug Manufacturers, 26
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Circuit represented the views of many of the sham litigation rule’s
detractors when it characterized application of the rule as “particularly
misguided” in the infringement context.256
Judicial insistence on creating a broad safe harbor within which
parties to patent litigation can freely settle on a relatively expansive
set of potential terms created a chasm between the perspective of the
antitrust agencies and the lower courts (with the exception of the
Third Circuit’s defection).257 By coalescing around a presumption of
illegality, the antitrust agencies were inclined to err on the side of
overdeterrence and capture all anticompetitive settlements, even if
legitimate ones were struck down in the process. Indeed the DOJ has
admitted that under its rule, some reverse payment settlements that
would otherwise create more competition than if the parties had not
settled may be terminated.258 In contrast, the sham litigation rule
reflects a preference for underdeterrence. Even if a reverse payment
settlement may have delayed generic entry, the lower courts were
willing to let it survive, displaying a remarkable hesitancy to revisit
the intricacies of a settlement.259 These fundamentally different
preferences for how reverse payment settlements should be treated
moves beyond simple dissatisfaction with the particular frameworks

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 141, 162 (2010).
256. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 214 (3d Cir. 2012).
257. Politics may initially appear to be a tempting explanation for the impasse, particularly
given the composition of the majority and the dissent in Actavis. (Justice Breyer, writing for
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, rejected the sham litigation rule, while the
more conservative trio of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas would have
approved the use of the sham litigation rule. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
Justice Alito was recused from the proceedings). Id. To be sure, the sham litigation rule’s
sharpest critics in the lower courts were also concentrated amongst the appointees of Democratic
presidents, for example: Judge Pooler (Clinton, Second Circuit), In re Tamoxifen Citrate
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212 (2d Cir. 2006) (Pooler, J. dissenting), and Judge Sloviter
(Carter, Third Circuit), In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d. But judges appointed by both
Democratic and Republican presidents perpetuated the trend in the lower courts by adopting the
sham litigation rule, for example: Judge Anderson (Carter, Eleventh Circuit), Valley Drug Co. v.
Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003) (Judge Anderson authored the Valley Drug
opinion), Judge Sack (Clinton, Second Circuit), In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d, Judge Trager
(Clinton, E.D.N.Y.), In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), Judge Greenaway (Clinton, D. N.J., Obama, Third Circuit), In re K-Dur Antitrust
Litig., 338 F. Supp. 2d 517 (D. N.J. Sept. 29, 2004), and Judge Kravitch (Carter, Eleventh
Circuit) and Judge Farris (Carter, Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation). FTC v. Watson Pharm.,
Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012).
258. See Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170,
at 24-25; see also Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 120-21 (explaining that the DOJ framework
will lead to an increase in Type I errors).
259. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d at 1337; In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
466 F.3d 187, 212 & n.26 (2d Cir. 2006).
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suggested by the antitrust agencies, and hints at some additional
motivation for the judiciary’s course of action. The especial burdens
generated by patent litigation, which would be rendered even greater
if a rule of overdeterrence with respect to settling was adopted, was
pushing the judiciary towards the adoption of a permissive bright-line
rule.
2. Courts as Cognitive Misers
Judicial adoption of the sham litigation rule bears a strong
resemblance to judges acting as cognitive misers, particularly given
that many of the district and appellate judges faced with reverse
payment settlement cases do not have the patent law expertise of the
Federal Circuit. When employing the sham litigation rule, courts
appeared content to uphold reverse payment settlements so long as
they allowed for entry prior to patent expiration and did not evince a
palpable manipulation of Hatch-Waxman, for example by creating a
bottleneck or obtaining a thirty-month stay via the filing of
objectively baseless litigation. Otherwise, courts have explained that
if a patent really is weak, generic companies will continue to attack it,
and a brand-name manufacturer will not be able to afford ongoing
protection through repeated reverse payment settlements.260
Manipulation of Hatch-Waxman and entry prior to patent expiration
served as the cognitive shortcuts by which judges would decide
whether to strike down a reverse payment settlement under antitrust
law. If a reverse payment settlement fell within a broad safe harbor,
the court needed to undergo only minimal engagement with both the
patented innovation at issue and the details of the consideration the
parties exchanged. When viewed from the perspective of cognitive
misers, judicial willingness to cling to the sham litigation rule was a
symptom of the search for a bright-line rule-based approach.
Yet the FTC’s objective quick-look test and the DOJ’s subjective
quick-look test are both relatively formalistic, and both are what
Professor Louis Kaplow would term “presumptive rules,” in that the
“rule applies unless there appears to be sufficient reason not to apply
it.”261 Therefore at first blush, adopting either of these frameworks
260. See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 535 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) aff’d in
part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and aff’d in part sub nom., Arkansas Carpenters Health &
Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010); but see In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686
F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
261. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
561 n.6 (1992).
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may appear just as consistent with the cognitive miser phenomenon.
However upon closer inspection, the cognitive miser phenomenon
does in fact predict the judiciary’s adverse response to the antitrust
agencies’ proposals.
First, although the quick-look test the FTC put forward in In re
Androgel avoided a comprehensive rule of reason analysis, the test
required an adjudication of the underlying patent claims as a threshold
issue. Engaging in a trial-within-a-trial, even where the embedded
trial does not reflect an adversarial proceeding between the parties
who actually have adverse interests in its outcome, is not a new
proposition; for example courts for years have done so in the context
of malpractice claims against attorneys.262 Yet while resolution of the
antitrust challenge would be fairly straightforward once the merits of
the claims were analyzed,263 adjudicating a patent dispute as a
threshold inquiry in an antitrust challenge is not particularly
conducive to heuristic shortcuts, as discussed previously with respect
to the DOJ’s initial rule of reason proposal. Such a task would add
significant patent-related technological engagement to antitrust suits.
Indeed this aspect of the FTC’s objective quick-look test
appeared to pose the biggest affront to the Eleventh Circuit in In re
Androgel. Some may interpret the court’s aversion as flowing simply
from a general institutional concern over scarce resources. The
Supreme Court in Actavis openly speculated that “a general legal
policy favoring the settlement of disputes” and an “underlying
practical concern . . . that antitrust scrutiny of a reverse payment
agreement would require the parties to litigate the validity of the
patent”—which would necessarily “prove time consuming, complex,
and expensive”—were driving the sham litigation rule’s popularity.264
The Court even chided the Eleventh Circuit for adopting a rule based
on a single rationale, “the desirability of settlements.”265 Moving
settled claims back into the spotlight of litigation undeniably imposes
systemic costs on the courts as institutions, the parties as litigants, and

262. See, e.g., Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Damages in a Trial Within a Trial—A
Critical Analysis of Unique Concepts: Areas of Unconscionability, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 40, 41
(1989).
263. It would be straightforward, at least, if the patent holder was found more likely than
not to have lost the underlying suit. In this case, the settlement would be illegal. However, the
FTC never elucidated the framework for analyzing whether a settlement was anticompetitive
where the patent holder was likely to have won. See In re Cipro Cases I & II, 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d
165, 169 (Cal. App. 4th. 2011), review granted, 269 P.3d 653 (Cal. 2012).
264. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013).
265. Id. at 2237.

JENNY

282

4/2/2014 11:01 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

the public as taxpayers. As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out, the
FTC’s test would erase most of the benefits of settlement, as parties
would be forced to litigate the very claims they had sought to avoid
litigating.266 Across a spectrum of legal areas, courts frequently cite a
general public interest in settlement as a means of ending complex
and expensive litigation.267 The Eleventh Circuit was likely sensitive
to these traditional concerns when considering which test to adopt.
Any mode of analysis requiring litigation of claims otherwise
disposed of out of court imposes burdens the judiciary will be
disinclined to accept, absent offsetting benefits.268
This rationale ultimately falls short because the Eleventh Circuit
moved beyond praising the traditional benefits of settlement, to also
address concerns specific to the task of analyzing patents. In closing,
the court first emphasized its strong distaste for “attempt[ing] to
decide how some other court in some other case at some other time
was likely to have resolved some other claim if it had been pursued to
judgment.”269 But the court then went on to explain how this
undertaking was all the more inappropriate because it and its appellate
colleagues outside the Federal Circuit were “ill-equipped to make a
judgment about the merits of a patent infringement claim.”270
Congress intended for “appeals involving patent issues” to be handled
by the Federal Circuit alone, and the FTC’s approach would be “in
tension” with this goal.271
To a certain extent, this is a valid point. While any district court
can be called upon to analyze the merits of a patent infringement
claim—bringing to bear no more expertise than the Eleventh
Circuit—its decision is ultimately subject to review by the Federal
Circuit. In contrast, under the FTC’s test, a decision at least
implicating the merits of a patent infringement suit could completely

266. FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2012).
267. See, e.g., Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2010); FlexFoot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001); United States v. Glens Falls
Newspapers, Inc., 160 F.3d 853, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1998).
268. Cf. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371,
373 (2001) (arguing that civil litigation has evolved into transactional deals, largely driven by a
“judicial branch [which] has a vested interest in transactions that create finality because they are
thereby absolved of adjudicatory work”).
269. Watson Pharm., 677 F.3d at 1315.
270. Id.
271. Id. When Congress created the Federal Circuit in 1982, it granted the court exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals “from a final decision of a district court . . . relating to patents.” 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2011).
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circumnavigate Federal Circuit scrutiny.272
But the Eleventh Circuit appears to protest too much. The
Federal Circuit is not the sole arbiter of all “appeals involving patent
issues.” Instead, a more limited pool of claims, namely those “arising
under” patent law, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit.273 Not all claims implicating patent questions “arise under”
patent law.274 Patent law and antitrust have coexisted in cases both
within the Federal Circuit275 and outside of it.276 Indeed, patent law
has for years crept into cases outside of the Federal Circuit in a
variety of contexts,277 and continues to do so with little suggestion
that ex-Federal Circuit appellate courts should be stripped of their
jurisdiction to hear them. The Eleventh Circuit certainly made no
attempt to argue it lacked jurisdiction over the case because the
claims should be viewed as “arising under” patent law. Instead, the
court couched its comment within a discussion of its own lack of
expertise. In other words, if the court were to apply the FTC’s
framework, the claims would still be properly before the court from a
jurisdictional perspective, but in terms of institutional experience the
task of adjudication would be better channeled through the more
technologically-savvy Federal Circuit.278
In order to avoid a
perceived mismatch between subject matter and expertise of the

272. See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988)
(explaining that a case raising patent law only as a defense does not fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit and therefore is appealed to the regional circuit court of
appeals).
273. See Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“This court has exclusive jurisdiction to review cases . . . ‘arising under’ the patent
laws.”).
274. 8 CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 21.02[1].
275. For example under the affirmative defense of “patent misuse,” patent holders who
“impermissibly broaden[] the physical or temporal scope of the patent grant,” generally through
a violation of antitrust law, will be unable to enforce their patents against alleged infringers.
See, e.g., Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1326-31 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
276. See, e.g., In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 585 F.3d 677 (2d Cir.
2009); Covad Communications Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“Our
review of the patent courts’ opinions convinces us that Bell Atlantic’s case against Covad was
not objectively baseless.”).
277. See, e.g., Wisc. Alumni Research Found. v. Xenon Pharm., Inc., 591 F.3d 876 (7th
Cir. 2010); Dawn Equip. Co. v. Micro-Trak Sys., Inc., 186 F.3d 98 (7th Cir. 1999).
278. In a similar vein, some have suggested that reverse payment settlements be handled
solely through the patent system, rather than using antitrust law and generalist courts. See
Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281,
318-33 (2011) (arguing that a superior method of differentiating between pro- and
anticompetitive reverse payment settlements would be to send the disputed patent through the
Patent and Trademark Office’s patent reexamination proceedings).
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adjudicator, the court rejected the FTC’s test in favor of the sham
litigation rule. Just as “Federal Circuit formalism creates hard-edged
rules that reduce the weight and scope of technological inquiries,”279
the sham litigation rule creates a framework that significantly reduces
the necessity of inquiring into the patented technology that was the
subject of the contested settlement.
If courts are unconsciously receptive in this context to applying a
rule in lieu of a holistic standard, and one that avoids mimicking a
miniature patent trial, why stick with the sham litigation rule when the
DOJ’s bright-line presumptively illegal rule also avoids any
assessment of the patent dispute? Two forces related to the cognitive
miser phenomenon drove the judiciary’s preference for the sham
litigation rule over a DOJ-type presumptively illegal rule. First, a
presumptively illegal rule is still much more information-demanding
than the sham litigation rule. Second, such a rule threatens adverse
long-term consequences for courts, not merely in terms of fewer
settlements in general but a greater influx of patent litigation.
A presumptively illegal rule requires the defendants to bear the
burden of proof to show the payment was not for delay. The settling
defendants start with an uphill battle because, as described above, this
type of approach views the possibility of competition between the
companies as a property right held by consumers. In light of the
foregoing discussion regarding exclusion rules and in rem rights, it is
unsurprising that the DOJ selected a fairly bright-line rule to protect
the consumers’ property right—hence the presumption that a
conflicting ‘use’ of this property right by the settling companies will
not be tolerated. However, a presumptively illegal test flips the
perspective of the entitlement holder. Instead of protecting a patent
holder’s property right, the test is concerned with protecting
consumers’ property right in the possibility of competition. The DOJ
did blunt its exclusion rule by interposing elements of a governance
regime and allowing a reverse payment settlement to survive in
certain narrow situations. Defendants could rebut a plaintiff’s prima
facie case of anticompetitive effects (created whenever there is a
settlement with a predetermined entry date and compensation flowing
from the branded to the generic company), by showing that the
settlement did not result in a level of competition significantly less
than they expected to occur if the patent suit was litigated to a final

279.

Lee, supra note 6, at 41.
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judgment.280
Interjecting a cost-benefit analysis as a backstop serves as a
departure from the pure exclusion end of the exclusion-governance
spectrum, but the move is entirely consistent with this theory of
property rights. As Professor Smith explains, elements of governance
are often added to an exclusion regime as “a supplemental finetuning” device when “the pressure on and value of resources rise.”281
The FTC has estimated that delayed entry of a generic by even one
year has a multi-million dollar impact on third-party payers and
consumers.282 The DOJ evidently views drug policy as sufficiently
complex, and the intellectual property at stake sufficiently valuable,
to merit application of a test offering more flexibility than a pure
exclusion rule could provide. The generic companies in any given
settlement may be in vastly different positions in terms of their own
financial strength and the merits of their claimed right to market a
generic product. If the settling parties can show that the generic
manufacturer would actually be unlikely to both win in court and
have the capacity to timely become a vigorous competitor, the DOJ
has in effect determined that consumers are better off if the settling
companies are permitted to act in ways contrary to what it has defined
as the consumers’ property right.283
But the additional nuance from this supplemental governance
regime comes, as always, with a price, and when courts evaluate the
defendants’ rebuttal, they bear far higher information costs than when
they apply the sham litigation rule. As discussed above, if the amount
of the payment is not roughly in line with the branded company’s
saved litigation costs, the DOJ would require the defendants to prove
that the settlement’s entry date truly reflected their evaluations of the
likely outcome of the underlying litigation. The DOJ acknowledged
“precision is impossible” with respect to this counterfactual inquiry,
but maintained that settling parties could successfully defend
themselves by “providing a reasonable explanation” of other
consideration received in exchange for the reverse payment.284 When
the Third Circuit adopted a presumptively illegal rule in In re K-Dur,

280.
28.
281.
282.
283.
284.
31-32.

Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
Nuisance, supra note 25, at 989.
Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 2.
Cf. Nuisance, supra note 25, at 978-79.
Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
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it described two ways for defendants to rebut the prima facie case.
The first option was the DOJ’s inquiry into the value of other
consideration the branded company had received in exchange for its
payment; the second, “probably rare” option would allow a patent
holder to show that the reverse payment settlement “offers a
competitive benefit that could not have been achieved in the absence
of a reverse payment,” such as where “a modest cash payment . . .
enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer to avoid bankruptcy and
begin marketing a generic drug.”285
As an initial matter, the premises of the Third Circuit’s test
confirm that the second option will rarely be a realistic option for
most defendants. This rule begins with the presumption that the
settlement erased some possibility of competition. Accordingly, the
defendants would have to show that this possibility of competition
would not actually have come about and thus the settlement, with its
pre-expiration entry date, would in fact lead to more competition than
if the parties had not entered into the settlement. One way of
demonstrating that the possibility of competition was but a mirage
would be to establish that the patent holder would have won in court.
But because the Third Circuit refused to look at the merits of the
underlying patent suit, the defendants would be relegated to showing
that, even assuming the patent posed no obstacle, the generic
company was not in a position to enter the market. Realistically, only
a narrow segment of settling defendants have such a relationship. For
all practical purposes, then, they would have had to pursue the first
option.
To succeed, the defendants would need to provide a thorough
explanation of the technology at issue in order to facilitate a decision
by the judge over the reasonableness of the consideration exchanged.
Particularly in comparison with the sham litigation rule, this would
entail considerable technological engagement. The sham litigation
rule, which does not offer a rebuttal phase, avoids this type of inquiry.
Far less information is necessary for a judge to determine that the
underlying infringement suit was not baseless, the settlement did not
restrict sales of drugs not at issue in the patent litigation, and entry
occurred prior to the expiration of the patent.
There is a second facet to the explanation of how the cognitive
miser phenomenon drove the vast majority of courts to select the
sham litigation rule over the presumptively illegal rule. The very

285.

In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
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preference for a bright-line rule with a default that stems the longterm flow of patent litigation is consistent with courts acting as metacognitive misers. Adopting a rule that facilitates reverse payment
settlements means parties are more likely to settle potential future
patent disputes, allowing judges to avoid altogether the technological
engagement required by a patent infringement suit.
A presumptively illegal rule threatens to siphon off patent
disputes that would have been settled out of court and instead forces
the judiciary to review these notoriously complex cases.
Not only does the rule’s default bar settlement—in contrast to
the sham litigation rule’s default, which upholds the settlement—but
it is difficult to imagine a defendant overcoming the prima facie case.
The cumulative effect is an ex ante decrease in the incentive to
attempt to settle at all.286 Moreover, adopting a presumptively illegal
rule could have spillover effects and inhibit a broader scope of patentrelated agreements. The test implicitly presumes consumers have a
property right in the possibility of competition prior to the expiration
of the patent. Once this concept establishes a toehold, expharmaceutical industry patent settlements or even licensing
agreements between patent holders and potential competitors could be
vulnerable to the chilling threat of an antitrust suit.287
Applying the sham litigation rule does simultaneously address
some of the more short-term concerns driving settlement in general,
namely protecting the limited institutional resources of the courts (and
indirectly, the public fiscally). However, as this section will explain,
reverse payment settlements are not the type of litigation that tends to
be the subject of lighter judicial scrutiny. The generalist judge’s often
uncomfortable relationship with patent litigation provided the
supplemental impetus to overcome the ardent objections from the
antitrust agencies that broadly allowing all but the most egregious
reverse payment settlements is injurious to the public.
286. See Schildkraut, supra note 106, at 1049 (predicting that the “likely” result of courts
applying a DOJ-type quick-look test based on probabilistic patent protection would be “far
fewer settlements of patent litigations”).
287. See Kevin D. McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Settlements and Antitrust: on
“Probabilistic” Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003, at 72-73 (“If we
define patents as having diminished ‘strength,’ why should protection of that alleged ‘consumer
surplus’ be limited to settlements? Consider licenses. As Shapiro perceptively observes,
‘[v]irtually every patent license can be viewed as a settlement of a patent dispute.’ When a
patentee grants any license, therefore, should the government be scrutinizing the royalty rate to
ensure that consumers face a price low enough to preserve their ‘property right’ in the
possibility that the patent is invalid?”); see also FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2245 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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When appellate courts have adopted the sham litigation rule,
they have generally been affirming a district court’s decision to apply
the same approach.288 As the adjudicators on the front lines of patent
litigation, district courts would have been particularly prone to
selecting a framework of analysis not simply out of a general concern
that settlement be encouraged, but as long-run cognitive misers
seeking to stem the growing tide of patent claims. District courts
have been experiencing a marked increase in patent litigation. In
2007, plaintiffs commenced 2,896 patent cases, and by 2011 this
figure had increased by nearly 40%.289 As district judge Patti Saris
has noted, “Patent litigation is like the neurosurgery of litigation: it is
hard scientifically and it is hard legally.”290 The Federal Circuit
reverses district court patent decisions with relative frequency (as
compared to the district court reversal rate in other areas of law), and
Judge Saris further reflected that the “high reversal rate demoralizes
many federal district court judges,” rendering district courts nothing
but “a weigh station along the way to” having their appeal heard by
the Federal Circuit.291 Given the combination of a technologically
challenging area of law and a sense among at least some judges that it
is also an area in which they achieve less success, a rule threatening to
further inhibit settlement when patent cases are already on the rise
would seem a ghastly specter.

288. See FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) (affirming approach
of In re Androgel Antitrust Litig., 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1378 (N.D. Ga. 2010)); Arkansas
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), as corrected (June
17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606, 179 L. Ed. 2d 517 (U.S. 2011) (affirming approach of
In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (same); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming approach of In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 129 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). Before the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the sham litigation rule, both district courts faced with
the choice chose the sham litigation rule. See King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc.,
702 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (E.D. Pa. 2010); In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., CIV.A.01-1652(JAG),
2009 WL 508869 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2009) report and recommendation adopted, CIV. A. 01-1652
JAG, 2010 WL 1172995 (D.N.J. Mar. 25, 2010).
289. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 130 (2011). Before 2007, the numbers were fairly level, for example in FY
2005 there were 2,720 patent cases filed in district court. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES
PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl C-2 (2006). In FY 2003
there were 2,700 patent cases filed. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS tbl C-2 (2004).
290. The Honorable Kathleen M. O’Malley et. al., A Panel Discussion: Claim
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 682
(2004).
291. Id.
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Although the appellate courts were not as directly affected as the
district courts by an increase in patent litigation, they would still reap
institutional benefits from a rule that, by making most reverse
payment settlement challenges futile, keeps them out of court.
Furthermore, the appellate courts were aware of, and seemed to
sympathize with, the added patent caseload the district courts would
face if forced to apply a rule of presumptive illegality. The Second
Circuit expressed concern that a rule “severely restricting patent
settlements” would “forc[e] patent litigation to continue.”292 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that a rule “foreclose[ing] a patentee’s
ability to settle its infringement claim” would increase “[p]atent
litigation[, which] breeds a litany of direct and indirect costs.”293
Although appellate courts would not need to adjudicate the resulting
jump in patent infringement suits both they and the district courts
predicted would result from a rule of presumptive illegality, the
appellate courts were palpably concerned with the consequences of
such a rule.
That judges may act in ways that create institutionally
advantageous case management is not a new proposition,294 and in the
recent era of austerity and budget cuts, the issue of how limited
judicial resources affects the organization and output of the courts has
received increased attention.295
Professor Bert Huang has
documented an analogous phenomenon, triggered by the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) decision in 2002 to initiate a concerted
effort to clear out a backlog of deportation cases.296 Particularly
because most of the BIA’s subsequent decisions involved upholding
deportation orders, the federal courts of appeals faced a deluge of

292. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006).
293. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074-75.
294. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of
Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 623-35 (1994) (arguing that judges are prone to using the
rules of procedure in ways that will enable them to avoid presiding over cases which they do not
wish to decide on the merits).
295. See, e.g., Marin K. Levy, Judicial Attention As A Scarce Resource: A Preliminary
Defense of How Judges Allocate Time Across Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 401 (2013) (describing how courts institute case management practices such as
staff attorney review and no argument submission so as to use limited judicial resources in a
way that maximizes error correction and law development); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity
and the Substance of Constitutional Law, 122 YALE L.J. 422 (2012) (arguing that limited
judicial capacity has influenced the Supreme Court’s decisionmaking in “high volume” and
“high stakes” constitutional cases, by “creat[ing] strong pressure on the Court to embrace hardedged categorical rules, defer to the political process, or both”).
296. Bert I. Huang, Lightened Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (2011).
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petitions for review.297 The avalanche happened to be concentrated in
the Second and Ninth Circuits and continued unabated for several
years, thereby setting the stage for a natural experiment. Huang
compared the overall reversal rate of district court opinions in the
Second and Ninth Circuits with the reversal rate in the other,
relatively unaffected circuits.298 In the two circuits enduring a surge
in BIA appeals, the rate at which district courts were reversed
dropped significantly.299 Huang dubbed this phenomenon “lightened
scrutiny”: because the influx of BIA appeals severely strained the
resources of the Second and Ninth Circuits, these courts effectively
chose to triage, shifting resources at the margins away from review of
district court decisions and toward review of the BIA cases.300
Selection of the sham litigation rule reflects a similar type of
institutional decision to employ lightened scrutiny on reverse payment
settlements. First, this application of lightened scrutiny implicates
concerns over limited capacity. Patent cases are notoriously resourceintensive,301 so much so that district courts have increasingly adopted
local rules applicable only to patent litigation, with the goal of
streamlining their resolution.302 Alongside the 40% increase in patent
cases from 2007–11, there was also a 5.8% increase in total cases303
and the average number of cases per judgeship rose from 380 to
427.304 To the extent the rise in patent litigation has strained present
and threatened future district court resources, it seems natural that it
contributed to the subconscious decision to effectively apply
lightened scrutiny to reverse payment settlement cases. If the path to
settlement is obstructed, courts may reasonably fear that they will not
have the resources to deal with the resultant increase in patent
litigation. Applying the sham litigation rule mitigates the costliness
of technological engagement in the long run, by allowing would-be

297. Id. at 1122-23. BIA decisions are appealed directly to the appellate court with
jurisdiction over the state in which the immigration judge who initially processed the foreign
national is located. Id. at 1123, 1125.
298. Id. at 1130-34.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1137.
301. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
(2011).
302. JOESPHE E. CWIK, LITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES
(2012), available at 2012 WL 1670113.
303. STATISTICS DIV., OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 10 (2011).
304. Id. at 16.
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patent litigants to pursue a broader range of settlement terms.305
Using the sham litigation rule as a mechanism to apply lightened
scrutiny may reflect not only a judicial concern with more patent
litigation in the long term, but an intuition that more intensive
adjudication of reverse payment settlement cases is an inefficient use
of resources. As Judge Saris’s comments allude to, many district
courts may lack confidence they are getting it right when they analyze
legal issues involving patents. The sham litigation rule is consistent
with triaging to shift resources to areas where they will have a greater
marginal benefit—in other words to where courts are more
comfortable they can accurately apply their legal acumen.
This motivation also explains why the judiciary’s triage of
resources away from reverse payment settlements otherwise seems to
conflict with how courts otherwise tend to allocate their limited
resources. Professor Marin Levy analogously hypothesized that
appellate courts seeking to maximize their “output” of “error
correction and law development” would “seek out certain cases—
those that are complex and those that present novel issues of law” and
apply relatively higher levels of judicial resources to these cases,
while “certain kinds of cases—repeating appeals, patently frivolous
appeals, and those that have received at least one meaningful review
before reaching the appellate courts” would receive “less judicial
attention.”306 Levy found that appellate court case management
techniques were consistent with her predictions.307 For example,
cases involving repeating issues such as sentencing appeals are very
frequently decided on the briefs primarily by staff attorneys, while
cases that were already reviewed prior to arriving on the district
court’s docket, such as Social Security and BIA appeals, are also
given no-argument status at very high rates.308 Implementing these
types of institutional case management rules allow judges to
maximize the “output” achieved with fairly fixed inputs by
“spend[ing] less of their own attention”—arguably the most costly
and limited judicial resource—”on cases that they thought could be

305. Defenders of reverse payment settlements argue that different positions in terms of
risk aversion and information asymmetries can lead to situations where bargaining would be
unlikely to lead to a mutually agreeable settlement if reverse payments were off the table. See
John P. Bigelow, Pharmaceutical Patents, Settlements, “Reverse Payments,” and Exclusion,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRONICLE 4-5 (June 2012).
306. Levy, supra note 295, at 435.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 436-38.
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corrected without full judicial treatment.”309
District courts, as much as the appellate courts Levy analyzed,
would be incentivized to maximize the value of their legal output
within the constraints of fixed resource inputs. Levy’s work, then,
predicts that antitrust challenges to reverse payment settlements, as
“complex” cases involving “novel issues of law,” should receive “full
judicial treatment.”310 Yet both district and appellate courts crafted a
legal rule that insulates the vast majority of such cases from almost
any judicial review. The judiciary seems to have manifested a
conviction that pouring resources into these cases would not
maximize the value of their legal output.
Shifting resources away from areas in which they feel relatively
ill-equipped to adjudicate accurately is also a way of deferring to
those with greater expertise: the parties themselves. Such deference
to authority is yet another typical expression of the cognitive miser
phenomenon.311 Indeed, the assumption that the parties, rather than
the courts, know best was a recurrent element of judicial approval of
the sham litigation rule. As the District Court for the Eastern District
of New York explained, it is to be “expected that the market would
correct for any bolstering of flagrantly invalid patents by way of
exclusion payments.”312 If a branded manufacturer were able to slip
through a settlement that effectively pays a generic to stay off the
market, courts frequently explained that the economics of the
situation predicts it would not be a long-term problem, particularly
given Hatch-Waxman’s incentives for generics to file suit.313 Courts
are aware that patents are a particularly effective promoter of
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry,314 and they may have
believed that a judge’s decision about whether generic entry occurred
“too late” under a settlement would simply end up being wrong more
often than not, disturbing the balance of incentives to innovate.315
309. Id. at 431.
310. Id.
311. Lee, supra note 6, at 24.
312. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 535
(E.D.N.Y. 2005). See also FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012);
In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211-12. In choosing the alternate course, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals explicitly disagreed that “subsequent challenges by other generic manufacturers will
suffice to eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse payment to the initial challenger.”
In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 215 (3d Cir. 2012).
313. See In re Ciprofloxacin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
314. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 507-15 (2009).
315. Cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L.
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The parties themselves know more about the relevant technology and
relative strength of the patent, and through private bargaining may
reach a more accurate assessment of when, prior to patent expiration,
generic entry is warranted.316
Some might argue that selection of a default rule that upholds
reverse payment settlements simply reflects the oft-noted preference
in the antitrust context for Type II errors (wrongly allowing an
anticompetitive agreement to stand) over Type I errors (wrongly
condemning an agreement as anticompetitive).317
But this
explanation fails to account for the dramatic nature of the split
between the courts and the antitrust agencies. Many commentators
have noted that the antitrust agencies have also participated in the
judiciary’s trend toward preferring Type II errors over Type I
errors.318 But the antitrust agencies have become so convinced of the
anticompetitive effects of reverse payment settlements that they have
REV. 972, 977-78 (1986) (“[T]he rules must accommodate the judges’ limits, rather than the
other way around. In other fields, the inability of judges to decide what is efficient business
conduct and what is not is a foundation for powerful rules compelling judges to keep their hands
off—in corporate law this is known as the business judgment doctrine. Why should antitrust
law demand of judges and juries answers that other branches of the law know courts cannot
supply?”).
316. Cf. Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 24-25, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130)
(“Often price is not the only important term in these deals and courts are woefully inadequate
compared to the marketplace for determining and enforcing these other terms . . . [P]rivate
ordering among parties can lead to textured contracts having many terms including price but
also including a host of seemingly esoteric and unique provisions—such as technical support,
field-of-use or territory limitations, grant-backs, cross-licenses, payment schedules, mostfavored-nation provisions, etc. . . .”); Nuisance, supra note 25, at 985 (“Given positive
information costs, there is good reason to think that using the exclusion strategy often yields a
better result than would combining governance rules and devices to minimize strategic behavior.
Under governance rules, a court has to weigh the value of various uses . . . . Where courts have
limited abilities to identify and evaluate the competing information about uses presented by
parties . . . [they] can engage in strategic behavior that defeats the owner’s investment in the
asset.”).
317. See Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75,
113-15 (2010); see also Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation:
Competition For and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1413 (2003)
(describing shift in antitrust law toward a preference for Type II errors, based on a perception
that their cumulative effect is less costly to general welfare); Easterbrook, supra note 166, at 1517 (explaining that Type 1 errors are often more harmful than Type II errors because it is
generally easier for the market to undercut and correct for monopolies than to correct for judicial
errors).
318. See, e.g., William Bradford, The Creation and Destruction of Price Cartels: An
Evolutionary Theory, 8 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 285, 291 (2012); Devlin & Jacobs, supra note 317,
at 79-83; Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review:
Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 171-72 (2008) (discussing
how institutional design of merger review incentives underenforcement by the FTC and DOJ).

JENNY

294

4/2/2014 11:01 PM

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 30

selected a rule that openly acknowledges its preference for Type I
errors. Courts, nonetheless, have stayed the course. The judiciary’s
preference for committing a Type II error rather than a Type I error,
despite the agencies’ implicit insistence that the invariably
anticompetitive effect of these settlements overcomes any theoretical
basis for preferring Type II errors, is a reflection of the cognitive
miser phenomenon. If courts feel particularly pessimistic about their
accuracy in identifying the truly anticompetitive deals, the agencies’
vocal complaints about the especial harm these settlements pose
would fall on deaf ears. Courts would prefer to avoid expending
significant resources by entangling themselves in the details of the
dispute, and instead commit a Type II error and allow the market
participants to straighten out the consequences.
Prior to Actavis, courts consistently rejected the notion that the
additional precision supplied by the DOJ’s rule would be worth the
costs of attempting to develop for themselves the necessary
information about the settlement. The judiciary’s overwhelming
preference for the sham litigation rule indicates that they do not
believe the benefits created by the extra precision and over-deterrence
of the DOJ rule outweigh the costs of the sham litigation rule’s underdeterrence, and it is the cognitive miser phenomenon driving this
calculus.
V. ENDING THE IMPASSE
With the courts generally refusing to apply the strict review
called for by the antitrust agencies, both sides had become entrenched
in diametrically opposed positions. Congressional subcommittees
entertained proposed legislative solutions to the disagreement, but no
bill ever attained significant momentum,319 despite the FTC’s pleas to

319. Failed Senate proposals include Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27,
112th Cong. (2011); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 369, 111th Cong. (2009);
Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 316, 110th Cong. (2007); Preserve Access to
Affordable Generics Act, S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2006). Comparable bills have been introduced
in the House, only to similarly stall in sub-committees. See Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs, H.R. 1706 (2009); Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, H.R. 1432,
110th Cong. (2007). There have been several attempts to attach anti-reverse payment settlement
provisions to other pieces of legislation—for example one such provision was added initially
added to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Jared A. Favole, Health Bill Drops
Ban on Deals Between Brand-Generic-Drug Makers, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2010 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704743404575128554066715036. One
senator even sought to add a ban on reverse payment settlements to the bill reauthorizing FDA
user fees, but the suggested amendment was voted down by a wide margin. U.S. Senate, U.S.
Senate Roll Call Votes 112th Congress—2nd Session, On the Amendment (Bingaman Amdt.
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Congress.320 For nearly a decade the Supreme Court, too, stayed
above the fray by repeatedly declining to grant certiorari in a reverse
payment settlement case. The Court’s decision in Actavis ended the
impasse, but it did not terminate the impact of the cognitive miser
phenomenon on antitrust challenges to reverse payments settlements.
This driving force behind the persistence of the intergovernmental
stalemate will significantly impact how the lower courts choose to
execute the open-ended mandate in Actavis.
The Supreme Court rejected both the majority approach among
the lower courts and the position of the antitrust agencies. The FTC
sought approval of the minority rule from the Third Circuit.321 The
settling drug companies asked the Supreme Court to affirm the
Eleventh Circuit and give its blessing to the sham litigation rule. The
dissenters would have done so, insisting that “the rights conferred by
the patent . . . form[] the zone within which the patent holder may
operate without facing antitrust liability.”322 The majority instead
held that, as in most antitrust challenges, courts must apply the rule of
reason.323 In effect, the Court settled on a compromise between the
two warring factions.
In taking such a middle ground, the Supreme Court acted very
much in keeping with its recent patent law decisions. As Professor
Lee has observed, while the Federal Circuit has adopted a formalistic
approach to patent litigation, the Supreme Court has been trending
towards a “holistic” standard-based approach, requiring lower courts
to “engage in multifactored examinations of inventions and their
technological context.”324 Recently, and repeatedly, the Supreme
Court has criticized the Federal Circuit for being too formalistic.325 In
No. 2111).
320. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 3, at 6; Rosch, supra note 104; Jon
Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Center for American Progress (June
23, 2009).
321. Brief for the Petitioner at 41, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12416), 2013 WL 267027.
322. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2238 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
323. Id.
324. Lee, supra note 6, at 46-47.
325. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (“Section 101 is a ‘dynamic
provision designed to encompass new and unforeseen inventions.’ A categorical rule denying
patent protection for ‘inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress . . . would frustrate the
purposes of the patent law.’” (citations omitted)); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398,
419 (2007) (“Helpful insights, however, need not become rigid and mandatory formulas; and
when it is so applied, the TSM test is incompatible with our precedents. The obviousness
analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation, or by overemphasis on the importance of published articles and the explicit content
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turn, the Court has been accused of adopting broad, unwieldy
standards, which it enjoys the luxury of rarely having to apply.326 By
rejecting the proposals of the parties before it as unnecessarily rigid
and instead mandating a more amorphous inquiry, the Court mirrored
its recent patent infringement decisions.
The Court left open “the structuring” of this rule of reason
inquiry but observed that the likelihood of anticompetitive effects will
depend on the payment’s “size, its scale in relation to the payer’s
anticipated future litigation costs, its independence from other
services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any
other convincing justification.”327 Despite listing several potential
factors to consider, the opinion’s concluding paragraph observes that
trial courts are free to exercise great discretion in structuring their
analyses, so long as they avoid “the use of antitrust theories too
abbreviated . . . [or] consideration of every possible fact or theory
irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on [the antitrust
analysis].”328 Simply warning lower courts against being too brief or
too exhaustive confers upon them considerable unguided discretion.
In particular, courts will have to answer four major questions as they
decide how to proceed. The first is the extent to which the strength of
the patent holder’s infringement lawsuit can serve as a counterweight
against factors otherwise indicating anticompetitive effects; or, vice
versa, the extent to which a purportedly weak claim for infringement
will be used as the signal of an anticompetitive settlement.
Regardless of the answer to this question, courts must next determine
what additional factors they will consider as part of their analyses.
Third, one of these factors will undoubtedly be the size of the reverse
payment, which the Court emphasized is a useful proxy for the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects. But it is less clear how courts
should use size to ascertain accurately this likelihood. Most would
agree that the unique context of any given settlement demands a more
nuanced inquiry beyond looking to the sheer magnitude of the
payment. Finally, courts must determine which settlements are not
encompassed within the ruling in Actavis, in other words which
settlements need not undergo a rule of reason analysis. The cognitive
of issued patents.”).
326. See Lee, supra note 6, at 63 (“[T]he Court is free to announce broad, policy-oriented
standards without considering the difficulties of applying them in myriad technological contexts.
In an economic sense, the Court’s preference for standards imposes an information-cost
externality on district judges.”).
327. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
328. Id. at 2238.
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miser phenomenon sheds light on how the lower courts are likely to
respond.
As to the first question, courts will generally be loath to rely on
any significant inquiry into the merits of the patent infringement suit.
The Actavis majority confidently predicted that litigating the very
patent dispute the parties had attempted to bypass would itself be a
largely avoidable task.329 When the DOJ proposed a quick-look test,
it shared the Court’s optimism regarding the “unlikely” need to use
“mini-trials of patent validity . . . in determining whether competition
was unreasonably restrained.”330 The dissent criticized this sentiment
as wishful thinking, prophesizing that settling defendants will stay
silent on this issue only if they are barred from bringing it up.331
When adopting a presumptively illegal rule, even the Third Circuit
agreed “there is no need to consider the merits of the underlying
patent suit.”332 Despite adopting a radically different approach than
the majority of the lower courts, the Third Circuit’s refusal to
incorporate the merits of the underlying patent infringement suit into
its inquiry was notably consistent with the sham litigation rule.
Litigating the patent dispute as a threshold inquiry to an antitrust suit
is simply a task any cognitive miser would prefer to avoid, and in fact
is one nearly every court thus far has avoided. As courts move
forward, they will likely take the Supreme Court up on its offer and
generally find it “normally not necessary to litigate patent validity.”333
Regardless of how accurate this factor is as a proxy for
anticompetitive effects, courts are unlikely to accord it a central role
in their rule of reason analyses.
In its place, courts will turn to factors they can ascertain more
reliably and at lower cost. Lee has argued that the high information
costs often attendant to multi-factor balancing tests can be mitigated if
the Supreme Court provides lower courts with guideposts more

329. Id. The majority may have recognized that focusing on the strength of the patent
holder’s infringement lawsuit undercuts a purported rule of reason approach, by de facto
imposing a per se bar on reverse payment settlements. This is so because there would be little
incentive for parties to ever enter into a reverse payment settlement if they knew they would
almost inevitably have to litigate the infringement suit anyway as part of an antitrust challenge.
See Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 115 & n.295.
330. Brief for the United States in Response to the Court’s Invitation, supra note 170, at
31 n.13.
331. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013).
332. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
333. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2244 (2013).
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clearly structuring its expected inquiry.334 For example, the Court
could delineate a relatively constrained set of weighted factors for
courts to analyze.335 Although Actavis did not curb lower courts’
potential information costs in this manner, courts can engage in some
self-help. Providing clear and consistent indications of the factors
they will analyze under the rule of reason acts as a roadmap for each
court’s subsequent decisions. It also serves to signal to the litigating
parties the type of factors they should focus upon, which narrows the
scope of the arguments presented to the court. There will also be an
added institutional benefit of easing some of the uncertainty potential
litigants may feel, thereby encouraging pharmaceutical companies to
still enter into settlements.
In addition to remaining predictable, the factors will likely be
objectively quantifiable indicia relating to the context of the
settlement. Well before the Actavis decision, Professors Butler and
Jarosch argued in favor of a rule of reason approach and offered up a
set of six factors targeting “the context and characteristics of the
[reverse payment] settlement.”336 Butler and Jarosch acknowledged
the significant information costs imposed by a rule of reason test.337
However, they were confident their proposal could at least streamline
the analysis by channeling a court’s attention to the most significant
indicators of the settlement’s potential anticompetitive effects, and all
without litigating the patent dispute.338 The type of factors Butler and
Jarosch suggest, such as the difference in time between the
settlement’s entry date and the patent’s expiration date, whether the
patent holder has market power, and the financial health of the
generic company,339 are a good institutional fit for district courts
because they more closely mirror the type of fact-finding these courts
have experience in performing. Courts remain in familiar territory
and minimize the cognitive burdens of applying rule of reason.
Size of the payment is also one of the factors Butler and Jarosch
argue should be examined.340 But they eschew strict numerical

334. Lee, supra note 6, at 66-68.
335. Id.
336. Butler & Jarosch, supra note 2, at 115-19 (explaining that courts should consider “1)
Market power; 2) The entrance date allowed by the reverse-payment settlement; 3) The relative
size of the reverse payment; 4) The ANDA filer’s ability to market the drug without a reverse
payment; 5) Sham litigation; and 6) Suspect side deals”).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 115.
339. See id. at 115-19.
340. Id.
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thresholds for when a reverse payment will be deemed
anticompetitive and instead assert that courts should evaluate the size
of the payment relative to the value of the patent and the litigation
costs parties likely would have incurred.341 As with the other factors
suggested by Butler and Jarosch, this type of inquiry requires courts
to compare a characteristic of the settlement with objectively
quantifiable factors, which courts can ascertain at relatively minimal
cost because they are accustomed to engaging in this type of factfinding. Furthermore, by announcing the metrics against which the
size of a reverse payment will be measured, courts allow parties,
during the course of settlement negotiations, to calculate when a
payment risks becoming so large that courts would view it as raising a
red flag. By broadcasting a range of payments that they will
generally consider to be low risk, courts allow parties to react
accordingly when structuring a settlement. As a result, the antitrust
agencies would be less likely to view bringing a challenge to court as
an efficient use of agency resources.342
Finally, courts will probably tend to narrow the breadth of
Actavis’s application, cabining its relevance to settlements involving a
flow of cash, rather than other forms of compensation, from the
brand-name to the generic company. The Court’s opinion leaves
ambiguity as to the spectrum of settlements now subject to rule of
reason antitrust scrutiny. So far, every challenged reverse payment
settlement has involved a cash payment from the brand-name
company. And while the FTC’s brief to the Supreme Court in Actavis
was most skeptical of the “extraordinary and distinguishing feature of
reverse-payment agreements . . . a substantial cash payment from the
brand-name manufacturer that holds a patent,” in a footnote the FTC
pondered “what other consideration would similarly justify a ‘quick
look’ analysis,” besides “direct payments of money.”343 The Court
expressed concern over “payment in return for staying out of the
market” but neither limited the form of the payment to cash nor even

341. Id. at 117.
342. See generally James Langenfeld & Daniel R. Shulman, The Future of U.S. Federal
Antitrust Enforcement: Learning From Past and Current Influences, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 1
(2007) (discussing factors that influence federal antitrust enforcement trends); Cf. WILLIAM E.
KOVACIC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT 100: INTO OUR 2ND
CENTURY THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF BETTER PRACTICES 59 (2009) (describing how the
FTC’s ability to achieve its mission of protecting consumers depends on efficient allocation of
agency resources).
343. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 321, at 30, 36 n.7.
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defined the term “reverse payment settlement.”344 Indeed, as the
dissent points out, the Court’s rationale for applying rule of reason
antitrust scrutiny to the settlement before it extends equally to other
forms of consideration flowing from a brand-name to a generic
company.345 This is so because whatever the form of compensation
the patent holder transfers to a generic company, the patent holder
could still be using “its monopoly profits to avoid the risk” of losing
its patent through litigation.346 Third-party payers or the FTC may
seek to challenge settlements with non-cash consideration as subject
to a rule of reason analysis under Actavis. Courts will have a decision
to make regarding whether they are free, consistent with Actavis, to
apply the sham litigation rule to such settlements. The Third Circuit
already has district courts in disagreement on this question.347
For the same reason the courts favored the sham litigation rule in
the first place, they will be disinclined to expand rule of reason
scrutiny to settlements only arguably falling within the purview of
Actavis. By narrowing the scope of the holding in Actavis, courts can
stake out a pool of settlements still viable under the sham litigation
rule. In a decision the day before the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Actavis, a district court acted analogously to constrain the
Third Circuit’s ruling in In re K-Dur.348 The district court concluded
that the Third Circuit had used the term “reverse payment” to mean
“cash payment,” not other forms of consideration.349 Because the
settlement at issue involved only non-cash consideration from a
brand-name company to a generic, the district court ruled that the
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the Sherman Act.350 In
effect, the district court created a new bright-line rule to constrain
application of the presumptively illegal rule and avoid having to strike
down a settlement that terminated a patent infringement suit. Courts
confronted with construing Actavis’s rule of reason mandate will also
344. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013).
345. Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 2232.
347. Compare In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-2389 (PGS), 2013 WL 4780496
(D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013) (denying drug companies’ motion to dismiss and rejecting contention that
Actavis did not apply because the settlement did not involve a monetary payment) with In re
Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-995 (WHW), 2012 WL 6725580, at *6-7
(D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) (holding that Actavis applies only to settlements involving monetary
payments).
348. In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-cv-995 (WHW), 2012 WL
6725580, at *6-7 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012).
349. Id.
350. Id. at 7.
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similarly tend to create bright-line rules with the consequence of
narrowing the case’s applicability and allowing courts to continue to
utilize the sham litigation rule.
CONCLUSION
Almost uniformly, the lower courts persisted in granting reverse
payment settlements a broad safe harbor from antitrust scrutiny. Like
the courts, the antitrust agencies also selected a bright-line rule, but
the agencies would have erred on the side of over-deterrence, striking
down a reverse payment settlement unless the defendants could
overcome a presumption of illegality.
Courts often endorse
settlement as a desirable alternative to fully litigating a dispute. Yet
the reverse payment settlement context has been unusual because the
courts have done so in the face of the antitrust agencies’ vehement
insistence that settlement here will almost always entail costs to
consumers—through higher drug prices—that outweigh any savings
from curtailed litigation. The consistent ease with which courts have
overcome this friction implies propulsion by additional motivation.
The tendency of courts to apply bright-line rules as information-costsaving devices when dealing with both property rights and complex
patent and patent-related cases explains their decade-long divergence
from the antitrust agencies. Additionally, by giving reverse payment
settlements less scrutiny, courts hoped to facilitate patent settlements,
thereby allowing them to apply their institutional resources to cases
they were more confident they could accurately adjudicate. Although
the Supreme Court ultimately ended the intergovernmental stalemate
by requiring courts to analyze reverse payment settlements under a
rule of reason approach, the cognitive miser phenomenon will remain
relevant in this area of law. Under Actavis, courts have considerable
discretion in presiding over antitrust challenges to reverse payment
settlements. By considering how courts are susceptible to acting as
cognitive misers, parties can more accurately tailor their arguments to
those the court will tend to find persuasive.

